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We investigate how banking relationships that combine lending and underwriting services affect
the terms of lending, through both loan supply- and loan demand-side effects, and the underwriting
costs of debt and equity issues. We capture and control for firm characteristics, including differences
in the sequences of firm financing decisions (which we argue are likely to capture important cross-sectional
heterogeneity, and which previously have been ignored in the literature). We construct a structural
model of lending, which separately identifies loan supply and loan demand. Our approach results in
significant improvement in the explanatory power of our regressions when compared to prior studies.
We find no evidence that universal banks under-price loans to win underwriting business. Instead,
we find that universal banks charge premiums for loans and underwriting services to extract value
from combined lending and underwriting relationships. We also find that universal banks (as opposed
to stand alone investment banks) enjoy cost advantages in both lending and underwriting, irrespective
of relationship benefits. Part of the advantage borrowers may enjoy from bundling products  may be
a form of liquidity risk insurance, which is manifested in a reduced demand for lines of credit. We
also find evidence of a road show effect; firms that engage in debt underwritings enjoy loan pricing
discounts on the loans that are negotiated at times close to the debt underwritings.
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on the consequences for the pricing of financial transactions of 
the bundling of those transactions within the same banking relationship. From the outset 
it is important to distinguish bundling from illegal “tying.” Bundling is a well-established 
practice within the banking industry whereby banks offer multiple financial products and 
services to customers as a part of durable relationships. In theory, banks should price 
related product offerings to meet their internal profitability standards on a total customer 
relationship basis. In practice, banks generally offer arrays of products
1 to customers, and 
products may be bundled together. Laws do not prohibit this practice of relationship 
banking or product bundling as long as customers have the option to refuse bundling. 
Tying, on the other hand, is a different concept whereby the sale or price of a 
“main” product, in which the seller potentially has market power, is conditioned upon the 
requirement that customers also purchase the “other” products, with the goal of 
leveraging market power in the “main” product to improve the performance of “other” 
products.
2  Recent concerns about tying have been associated with claims that banks offer 
                                                 
1 Bank regulators classify products that banks offer into traditional and non-traditional banking products. 
Traditional banking products are products that traditionally are offered by banks such as bank credit, 
deposit, custodian business, cash management, and trust service. Non-traditional banking products are, for 
example, insurance policies, wealth management services, and securities underwriting. 
2 Tying can be illegal in any product markets by general antitrust laws because of its potential anti-
competitive effects. The Clayton Antitrust Act explicitly prohibits exclusive dealing arrangements or tying 
arrangements, where the seller conditions the sale of a desired product upon the buyer purchasing another 
product, where competition is likely to be lessened substantially. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14.  
    In the banking industry, section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendment of 1970 explicitly 
prohibits the tying of traditional banking products to non-traditional banking products. Consistent with the 
intent of the law, regulators have adopted a strict interpretation of illegal tying to include only transactions 
that give rise to the potential extension of market power in traditional banking products to non-traditional 
banking products. According to a Federal Reserve interpretation (see Fed Reg. 52024 Aug 29,2003), the 
bundling of banking products constitutes illegal tying only when all of the following conditions are met: 1) 
tying is initiated by the bank, 2) tying involves at least two products, a borrower’s “desired” traditional 
banking product and another non-traditional banking product, 3) the pricing and/or availability of the 
“desired” product is conditioned on the borrower’s purchase of another non-traditional banking product (a 
tied product), and 4) at the time of negotiation, the bank does not present meaningful unbundled   2 
discounts on their loans in exchange for receiving underwriting business. From a public 
policy perspective, the controversy over tying relates to two public policy concerns: the 
desires (1) to maintain competitiveness in the lending market, and (2)  to ensure that 
banks do not abuse the bank safety net by transforming lending income (within an 
insured bank) into underwriting income of an affiliate (that is, a part of the bank holding 
company outside of the insured bank). 
Concerns about tying lending to security underwriting to win underwriting 
business emerged only recently; until the 1980s the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was 
interpreted as prohibiting banks from underwriting corporate securities. As the restriction 
on underwritings was gradually lifted since 1987, regulatory interest in the consequences 
of the bundling of lending and underwriting services has increased. The Glass-Steagall 
Act was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. The law allows the bundling 
of lending and underwriting services by universal banks but the prohibition for tying 
remains.
3  
                                                                                                                                                 
alternatives to the borrower. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (2003) for some legal 
perspective and some discussion regarding the original intents of the anti-tying laws.  
    Closely related to anti-tying laws are concerns about transfers of income out of insured banks and into 
related bank affiliates. Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act 1913 prohibits any transactions that may 
benefit non-bank affiliates at the expense of insured banks. Effectively, this regulation prohibits banks from 
under-pricing loans to win underwriting businesses for their non-bank affiliates. The economic argument 
for this regulation is simple. Under-pricing loans might help weak banks increase their safety net subsidies 
by channeling income from insured banks to the uninsured security affiliates. 
 
3 The in-roads made by universal banks into the securities underwriting business have prompted 
competitive concerns among specialized investment banks. Press coverage (e.g., The Economist, 1/9/2003, 
American Banker, 9/27/2002) and practitioner surveys (e.g., Association for Financial Professionals 2004 
Credit Access Survey) worry that potential tying practices by universal banks may be used to compete 
unfairly for underwriting business against stand-alone investment banks. However, studies by regulators 
and government agencies indicate no widespread practice of illegal tying, despite the substantial increases 
in the market shares of universal banks in underwriting services. Regulators point to the need to distinguish 
between the illegal practice of tying and the legal practice of product bundling (e.g., General Accounting 
Office 2003). Not surprisingly, investment banks that are losing market share to universal banks may 
confound the two phenomena in their assessments of whether there is a “problem” of loan under-pricing by 
universal banks.  
   3 
Mullineaux (2003), among others, argues that the necessary conditions for illegal 
tying by universal banks are unlikely to be met in the current market environment. The 
corporate lending market for large firms is predominately a syndicated market, includes 
many lenders, and is highly competitive. If banks have little apparent market power in 
this segment of the market, there may be little potential to abuse power or to extend it to 
other (e.g., underwriting) services. A large firm would be unlikely to hire a particular 
universal bank as underwriter just to be able to get a loan from that bank at a reduced 
interest rate when the lending market is competitive, since prior to any discount loans 
would already have been priced at their marginal cost.
4  
Of course, in some circumstances, market power may be important. Garmaise and 
Moskowitz (2006) provides micro-level evidence at the county level that market power 
resulted from the reductions in bank competition after large bank mergers, which have 
negative economic and social consequences for those localities. Calomiris and 
Pornrojnangkool (2005) provide evidence that regional market power can exist for some 
lending market segments, such as middle-market lending, when a single lender dominates 
that segment of the market and borrowers are not large enough to obtain sufficiently 
attractive terms from lenders outside the region. However, the segment of the market in 
which banking relationships are most likely to combine lending with underwriting 
services is the large corporate segment, and these borrowers often enjoy national market 
access, making market power less likely. Nonetheless, it is possible that specific 
                                                 
4 Similarly, there are reasons to question whether violations of Section 23b are occurring, or that such 
violations could explain the growing market shares of universal banks in securities underwriting. Reforms 
of prudential regulation since 1991 (the FDICIA of 1991, and recent modifications of the Basel standards to 
emphasize internal risk controls at large banks), along with historically high bank capital ratios, should 
limit the incentives that large banks face to transfer income out of protected (deposit insured) commercial 
bank affiliates, even if regulators and supervisors were not able to observe and prevent safety net abuse. 
   4 
circumstances may exist that give banks an upper hand in negotiations with clients, which 
may give rise to illegal tying.
5  
Indeed, deeper multi-product relationships can be a source of market power for 
banks, although the pricing implications of market power in these circumstances are 
different from the pricing implications that arise in a non-competitive environment (like 
the one discussed by Mullineaux 2003). As Rajan (1992) shows, in a competitive 
environment with asymmetric information relationships predictably give rise to quasi 
rents for lenders, which banks reap in later phases of their relationships by virtue of their 
information advantage relative to other banks. Quasi rent extraction implies the possible 
presence of pricing premia on loans and underwriting services during the later stages of 
the bank relationship, and pricing discounts during the early phases. That pricing policy 
will arise in an environment where market power is absent, and where bank safety nets 
offer no incentive to shift income between lending and underwriting services.  
Thus, regardless of whether illegal tying of lending and underwriting are unlikely 
in the United States today, it is still of interest to understand the pricing consequences for 
lending and underwriting of their joint production. Has the bundling of lending and 
underwriting created net benefits from joint production, and if so, how have those 
benefits been shared between banks and their clients? Do those net benefits show 
themselves in the pricing of bundled lending and underwriting services? Do pricing 
policies depend in observable ways on the characteristics of lenders and borrowers, and 
do observable differences reflect strategic decisions by banks? 
                                                 
5 On August 27, 2003, the Federal Reserve released a Combined Consent Order to Cease and Desist against 
WestLB AG and its New York branch, citing violations of anti-tying restrictions.   5 
An important related question is whether universal banks enjoy a comparative 
advantage in providing lending and underwriting services in comparison to stand-alone 
investment banks. Universal banks have gained enormous market share in underwriting. 
Does that reflect a fundamental cost advantage or an unfair competitive advantage related 
to the possession of a commercial banking charter, or deposit insurance? Does the cost 
advantage of universal banks show itself in both the lending function and the 
underwriting function?  
We compare banks’ pricing behavior for bundled and non-bundled transactions, 
and compare the lending and underwriting costs charged by stand-alone investment banks 
with those charged by universal banks. Our study of pricing policies across these types of 
banks, and across different circumstances, provides new insights about the costs and 
pricing strategies of different banks under different circumstances, and offers some 
guidance to regulators about whether universal banks’ success should concern them.
6   
Section 2 provides a review of the literature. Section 3 reviews our data sources 
and our empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our findings, including the estimation 
of supply and demand functions for borrowing, and non-structural estimates of the cost of 
underwriting services. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Over the past two decades, research on combining lending and underwriting has 
substantially altered the view of the likely costs and benefits of such arrangements. Prior 
                                                 
6 A 10/2/3003 letter from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the U.S. General 
Accounting Office indicates their current effort the study loan pricing behavior to potentially improve the 
enforcement of anti-tying and loan underpricing regulations.   6 
to the mid-1980s, combining lending and underwriting was generally seen as undesirable 
from the standpoints of systemic stability and the quality of intermediation. But this point 
of view has been largely overturned by academic research, which was motivated in part  
by the policy debate over whether to deregulate bank power limitations that prevented the 
combining of underwriting and lending. 
White (1986) shows that historical experience in the U.S. with universal banking 
does not support the view that underwriting contributed to the failure of banks in the 
1930s; in fact, he finds that underwriting diversified bank income and reduced failure 
risk. Another early line of research on the joint production of lending and underwriting 
focuses on conflicts of interest. A conflict can arise from a moral hazard problem, where 
universal banks learn negative private information about a firm and induce the firm to 
issue debt in the market to repay outstanding loans to the bank before the negative 
information is revealed to the market. Here, bankers harm securities purchasers by 
withholding pertinent information from them. An adverse selection problem can also 
create a conflict of interest in this setting. Universal banks may cherry-pick transactions 
by lending to the best quality firms and bringing poor quality firms to the debt market.  
Benston (1989) looks at the Congressional allegations regarding impropriety by 
universal banks in the 1930s and concludes that they were generally without merit. 
Kroszner and Rajan (1994) also focus on the practices of the pre-Glass Steagall era and 
compare the ex-post performance of bonds underwritten by universal banks with bonds 
underwritten by investment banks, after controlling for ex-ante risk profiles. They find 
that bonds underwritten by universal banks default significantly less often than (ex-ante 
similar) issues underwritten by investment banks. That finding indicates that potential   7 
conflicts of interest either were absent or were overcome by other banking practices and 
reputational considerations.  
Focusing on bond issues from the same period, Kroszner and Rajan (1997) 
investigate ex-ante pricing of bonds (i.e., yield spreads over Treasuries) and document 
that the market rewards universal banks for placing their underwriting business within a 
separate subsidiary (as opposed to an internal department) as one of the ways to mitigate 
potential conflicts of interest, a finding that may help to explain the apparent lack of 
conflict observed in Kroszner and Rajan (1994).  
Joint production of multiple banking products can provide economies of scope 
due to information reusability and efficiency gains associated with better portfolio 
diversification, scale-related economies of scope in product delivery, and lower costs 
(e.g. Calomiris 2000, Calomiris and Karceski 2000). There is a vast literature on the cost 
functions in banks, which seeks to measure scope economies across activities, with little 
success (e.g., Berger and Humphrey 1991, Pulley and Humphrey 1993).
7 Another 
approach is to see how deeper bank relationships are reflected in the behavior of firms. 
De Long (1991) examines how the presence of universal bankers on corporate boards of 
                                                 
7 As pointed out by Rajan (1995), it can be difficult to detect scope economies due to difficulties in 
estimating bank cost functions precisely. A potentially more promising approach is to investigate micro-
level data that enable researchers to measure interactions among various types of production activities 
directly.  More recent studies pursue this line of analysis by comparing loan spreads, underwriting fees, and 
ex-ante performance of the security offerings between bundling and non-bundling transactions. 
Nonetheless, the results from these studies are not conclusive.  
    In addition to reducing clients’ interest costs and fees, and increasing the securities prices clients are able 
to obtain from their issues, universal banking also may permit borrowers to save transaction costs 
(including “face time”) by establishing more efficient communication procedures with a smaller number of 
financial institutions. Information production is costly for both banks and borrowers. The larger the number 
of banking relationships, the larger the amount of the resources a borrower has to allocate to communicate 
and coordinate with banks. To our knowledge, there is no study that directly focuses on transaction cost 
savings from bundling services, and we are unaware of any data that would permit such a study. While we 
do not pursue this line of research in this study, transaction cost savings from universal banking would be 
consistent with some of our findings, as discussed further below.  
   8 
directors affected corporate valuation. He finds that a Morgan partner on the board 
increased stock values by 30% ceteris paribus. Ramirez (1995) connects Morgan 
involvement with increases in the elasticity of credit supply in responding to firms’ 
needs. He shows that the presence of a Morgan partner substantially reduced the cash 
flow sensitivity of a firm’s investment. In other words, firms with access to a deeper 
banking relationship received a form of liquidity risk insurance. Below, we will return to 
this effect when considering how the presence of strong banking relationships affect 
firms’ demands for lines of credit. Lines of credit are an alternative source of liquidity 
risk insurance. To the extent that stronger banking relationships provide liquidity 
insurance, they should reduce the demand for lines of credit.  
Insofar as the joint production of lending and underwriting may give rise to 
stronger banking relationships, this may also allow bank quasi rent creation and 
extraction in the context of relationship management (e.g., Greenbaum, Kanatas and 
Venezia 1989, Sharpe 1990, Rajan 1992). In the case where it is costly for a firm to 
credibly communicate its prospects to the public or to other banks, an informed banker 
can gain market power that can potentially be translated into charging higher prices for 
some loans and other services. This line of reasoning receives more attention in our 
empirical discussion below. Some of our findings support the notion that bank-borrower 
relationships entail the creation of quasi rents, and that banks are able to extract some of 
those rents.  
Another way that stronger relationships can benefit firms is through the superior 
signaling ability of underwriters. Puri (1996) investigates bond yield spreads over 
Treasuries for the pre-Glass Steagall era and documents that universal banks obtain better   9 
prices for their customers than investment banks do. This provides some evidence of net 
benefits from the joint production of loans and debt underwriting.  For the more recent 
period, Gande, Puri, Saunders and Walter (1997) compare the yield spreads of bonds 
underwritten by investment banks with the spreads of bonds underwritten by subsidiaries 
of commercial banks from 1993 to 1995. They find evidence that firms obtain better 
pricing for their bonds when they have an existing relationship with the underwriting 
bank. Roten and Mullineaux (2002) investigate the same question for bonds underwritten 
from 1995 to 1998 but find that an existing relationship with the underwriting bank has 
no impact on bond pricing. However, they find that banks on average charge lower 
underwriting fees (measured by gross underwriting spreads) than investment banks, 
regardless of relationships.        
Schenone (2004) focuses on the possible effect of an existing lending relationship 
in reducing IPO underpricing. The study documents a substantial reduction in IPO 
underpricing for firms that have existing lending relationship with banks with 
underwriting capability (i.e., universal banks, as opposed to non-universal banks). 
However, whether the firms go public with their relationship banks (or, alternatively, 
choose to use another underwriter) has no incremental impact on IPO underpricing. One 
interpretation of these findings, which we try to take into account in our own results 
reported below, is that these results reflect selectivity bias. In particular, there may be 
characteristics associated with the decision of a firm to establish a relationship with a 
universal bank that are also associated with reduced IPO underpricing. The omitted 
variables that are of our interest here may be related to a firm’s expected financing needs. 
For example, a firm with exceptional business opportunities and a foreseeable need for a   10 
future IPO may be more likely to establish a relationship with a universal bank. It might 
be the case that the firm characteristic of exceptional business opportunities explains the 
lower IPO underpricing found in the study; the firm’s relationship with a universal bank, 
per se, may have no effect on underpricing.  
Drucker and Puri (2005) investigate 2,301 seasoned equity underwritings during 
the period 1996 to 2001. Of the 2,301 seasoned equity underwritings in their sample, 201 
issues are bundled with 358 loans (that is, loans and underwriting services are provided 
by the same institution). They estimate a gross underwriting spread equation and find that 
investment banks offer a discount on their underwriting fees when an equity underwriting 
is bundled with a loan.
8 The discount only applies to non-investment grade issuers, where 
the authors argue the gains from scope economies are relatively large. They find no 
underwriting fee discount for bundled issues underwritten by universal banks.  In 
addition, they perform a matched sample analysis of bundled and non-bundled loans, 
comparing their all-in-spreads, and find that universal banks give a pricing discount to 
loans that are bundled with underwriting deals. They find no loan pricing discount on 
bundled loans from investment banks. Their results are consistent with the existence of 
economies of scope between lending and underwriting, although the authors find that 
universal banks and investment banks pass on the associated cost savings to firms 
through different channels, depending of the skills in which they have a comparative 
advantage.  
 Several other studies, which differ from Drucker and Puri (2005) in their 
methodologies, report somewhat contrary results. Fraser, Hebb and MacKinnon (2005) 
                                                 
8 Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2004) similarly report lower interest rates and underwriting 
fees when the services are provided by the same bank, although they find a relationship advantage to the 
bank in the form of a higher probability of future business with the firm.   11 
examine 1,633 revolving loans and 320 non-convertible debt issues from three large 
banks (Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and Citibank) during the period 1997 to 
2001. They first run a regression controlling for the variables used in the matched sample 
analysis of Drucker and Puri (2005) and find a similar result for loan interest cost 
discount when banks bundle loans with underwritings. However, the discount disappears 
once fixed effects for lenders and additional control variables are included. They 
conclude that combining underwriting and lending in a single relationship has no impact 
on loan pricing by universal banks. It should be noted, however, that Fraser, Hebb, and 
MacKinnon (2005) categorize a loan as matched with an underwriting if the same bank 
acts as both a lender and an underwriter at any time during a five-year period, which is 
much longer than the period used to define matching in Drucker and Puri (2005). 
Sufi (2004) studies the underwriting fees and yield spreads of bonds underwritten 
by universal banks and investment banks from 1990 to 2003. The regression analysis 
includes firm fixed effects to control for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity among 
firms. The main finding of the paper is that universal banks provide a 10 to 15 percent 
discount in underwriting fees for joint transactions of loans and debt underwriting. 
However, there is no evidence of lower yields on bonds underwritten jointly with bank 
loans. This paper demonstrates that OLS estimates of the bond spread equation are biased 
and can lead to an incorrect inference when firm fixed effects are excluded or an 
insufficient number of control variables are included in the regression.   
In the table below, we present a summary of the relevant studies of the effects of 
combining lending and underwriting within the same relationship on bank fees and 
interest rates, and on securities offering prices, which we discuss above. Our primary   12 
objective in this paper is to revisit the issue of how bank relationships (both lending and 
underwriting) affect underwriting fees and the terms of loans. We employ a 
comprehensive dataset and a research methodology designed to isolate the effects of 
bundling on the supply functions for lending and underwriting. The distinguishing 
features of this paper include the following methodological innovations.  
 
Summary of Recent Empirical Literature 
 
First, our study is comprehensive in its treatment of firms’ financing decisions. 
Previous studies focus on a pair of transaction types (i.e., loans and debts, or loans and 
equities) and usually investigate the pricing or fees of one type of transaction, ignoring 
the other type of transaction (with the exception of Drucker and Puri 2005). For example, 
Sufi (2004) and Roten and Mullineaux (2002) study the impact of an existing lending 
Study  Study Period  Type of Relationship  Variables of Interests  Summary of Findings 
Kroszner and Rajan 1994  1921-1929
universal banks vs. investment 
banks debt underwritings  bond default rate 
Bonds underwritten by universal banks 
default significantly less. 
Puri 1996  1927-1929
universal banks vs. investment 
banks debt underwritings  bond offering price 
Universal bank underwritings obtain better 
offering prices. 
Kroszner and Rajan 1997  1925-1929
internal department vs. subsidiary 
underwriting structure  bond offering price 
Subsidiary underwritings obtain better 
offering prices. 
Gande, Puri, Saunders and 
Walter 1997  1993-1995
joint production of loans and debt 
underwritings  bond offering price 
Underwriters with existing lending 
relationships obtain better offering prices. 
bond offering price 
Existing lending relationships have no 
impact on offering prices. 
Roten and Mullineaux 2002 1995-1998
joint production of loans and debt 
underwritings  underwriting fee 
Universal banks charge lower fees 
regardless of existence of relationship. 
underwriting fee 
Investment banks with existing lending 
relationships charge lower fees for non- 
investment grade issuers but no discount 
from universal banks.
Drucker and Puri 2005  1996-2001
joint production of loans and SEO 
underwritings  loan spread 
Universal banks with existing lending 
relationships charge lower spread for loans 
but no discount from investment banks. 
Fraser, Hebb and MacKinnon 
20xx 
1997-2001
joint production of loans and debt 
underwritings  loan spread 
Underwriting relationships surrounding 
loan transaction has no impact on loan 
pricing.
underwriting fee 
Universal banks with existing lending 
relationships charge lower fees. 
Sufi 2004  1990-2003
joint production of loans and debt 
underwritings  bond offering price 
Existing lending relationships have no 
impact on on offering prices.
Schenone 2004  1998-2000
joint production of loans and IPO 
underwritings  IPO underpricing 
Prior relationships with  propsective 
underwriters reduce IPO underpricings 
regardless of who actually underwrites.   13 
relationship on underwriting fees and the pricing of bond underwritings but ignore any 
pricing implication for the loan itself. The reason to examine all bank-borrower 
interactions together is simple: Any discount of underwriting fees on bundled offerings 
will have no impact on firm financing costs or on bank revenues if banks compensate for 
that discount by charging higher spreads on bundled loans.
9 We construct a complete 
financing history of 7,315 firms (comprising of all loan, debt, and equity transactions
10) 
for the period 1992 to 2002, which spans a decade in which commercial banks gradually 
entered the underwriting business and eventually were allowed to compete freely in the 
market. We investigate the effects of relationships on underwriting fees (for both bonds 
and equities) and on loan prices.          
Second, our analysis of the loan market uses a structural modeling approach of the 
price and quantity of the loan. We explicitly allow the price and quantity of the loans to 
be determined jointly by the banks in our analysis. Our model posits determinants of loan 
supply and loan demand, some of which we identify as only affecting supply or demand. 
We utilize instruments to estimate loan supply and demand equations jointly using both 
two-stage least squares and a more robust Generalized Method of Moments approach. 
Previous studies have not tried to identify supply and demand, and thus have made strong 
implicit assumptions about the orthogonality of demand and supply effects. 
  Third, existing studies suggest that model misspecification is a possible 
explanation for the contradictory findings that appear in the various studies. Fraser, Hebb 
and MacKinnon (2005) show that discounts for loans from relationship banks disappear 
                                                 
9 This study focuses on the pricing of lending and underwriting services but not on the performance of the 
underwriting issues, which is also an important part of overall financing costs of an issuing firm. This issue 
is a subject of our future research.   
10 We exclude private placements of securities and commercial paper offerings for reasons discussed in 
section 3.     14 
once sufficient variables controlling for risk and fixed effects for lenders are included in 
the regressions. Sufi (2004) also shows that bond yield discounts disappear when fixed 
effects for issuers are included in the regressions. We identify and take into account three 
potential sources of model misspecification: (1) insufficient inclusion of balance sheet 
and income statement characteristics of borrowers and issuers in the list of explanatory 
variables that control for differences in firms’ riskiness; (2) insufficient controls for 
possible heterogeneity in the cost functions of lenders and underwriters; and (3) 
insufficient controls for heterogeneity in the financing strategies and objectives of 
borrowers and issuers (which could be relevant for loan pricing because they capture 
additional aspects of risk).  
In our regressions, we employ larger sets of control variables than previously 
studies, and include all variables previously found to be important either in the pricing of 
loans or the setting of underwriting fees. In addition, we include variables that distinguish 
the type of financial institutions in the transactions (i.e., universal banks vs. investment 
banks) as well as proxies for lender reputation. Finally, a novel aspect of our 
methodology is that we explicitly include variables that capture patterns of firm financing 
strategies in our regressions (in particular, the specific combinations of financings in 
which firms engage within defined windows of time). These variables capture otherwise 
omitted heterogeneity in firms that are likely related to risk, and which could influence 
the terms of loans and the fees charged by underwriters. The details of our regression 
specifications, and our dataset construction methods, are presented in Section 3. 
 
   15 
3. Data Sources and Research Methodology 
In constructing our dataset, our objective is to measure the effects of relationship 
formation on lending and underwriting behavior by capturing and controlling for firm 
risk characteristics, including the dynamic nature of firm financing needs. The effects of 
relationships have to be measured after controlling for the dynamic financing strategy of 
the firm. For example, if relationships are more frequently formed by firms that engage in 
many underwritings and loans at the same time, and if those firms have peculiar 
(otherwise unobserved) risk characteristics, then failing to control for the combination of 
financings chosen by the firm may lead to false inferences about the effects of 
relationships, per se, on loan pricing or underwriting costs.  
An ideal dataset would contain a complete and detailed history of firm financing 
transactions, including bank loans and all public and private placements of securities. 
Such a database is not readily available. To the extent that it can be approximated, one 
must construct firm financing histories by combining multiple data sources.   
This section details our approach to combining loan data from Loan Pricing 
Corporation’s DealScan database and underwriting data from Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) into a single dataset that contains all available information on the 
history of bank loans and public offerings for 7,315 U.S. firms during the period 1992 to 
2002. Our data include deal pricing information, firm characteristics, and information 
about the identity of lenders and underwriters for each deal.  
We exclude private placements of securities from our dataset due to the lack of 
pricing data for such deals. We do not regard the omission of private placements as a 
major shortcoming since private placements constitute a small portion of listed firms’   16 
financing transactions. Commercial paper offerings are also excluded, since these 
offerings are generally part of a long-term financing program (making the timing of the 
financing decision hard to measure) and because commercial paper offerings are 
accessible only to a select group of firms (for further discussion, see Calomiris, 
Himmelberg, and Wachtel 1995). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 
construct such a complete dataset of bank loans and public offerings and to use it to 
systematically address the issue of how relationship banking affects the pricing of 
financing transactions.   
Loan Data 
We searched the DealScan database for all bank loan deals for U.S. borrowers 
from 1992 to 2002. Since we are interested in industrial firms, we excluded all 
transactions related to financial institutions (firms with SIC 6) from the search. We also 
followed the precedent of many other studies by excluding regulated industries (those 
with SIC code starting with 43, 45, and 49)
 11 and government-related deals (those with 
SIC code starting with 9) from the search. We further exclude borrowers with no stock 
ticker information available from the dataset to restrict our study to listed borrowers. In 
each deal, the data contain all loan facilities associated with the deal along with the list of 
lenders and their roles for each facility in the deal. Data on the all-in-spread cost of loans 
and other loan characteristics are also available from this source. Table I provides a 
summary of loan observations in the study broken down by lender types, loan 
classifications, and loan distribution method.  
                                                 
11 We do not exclude all firms with SIC 4 to ensure that some high-tech and telecom industry firms are 
included in our study. These firms are a focus of tying accusations in the financial press and were active 
issuers during our study period.   17 
There are several points worth noting about the loan data. First, over the sample 
period, 1992 to 2002, the lending market is dominated by commercial banks. Roughly 
99% of loans in the sample have commercial banks in the leading roles. Investment banks 
participate in the lending market primarily through relatively large loan syndications 
where commercial banks act as joint lead lenders. Second, there is an increased usage of 
short-term revolver facilities instead of longer-term ones as a result of a favorable 
regulatory capital requirement rule for lines of credit with less than one year to 
maturity.
12 Third, an increasing number of loans are syndicated over time.     
Underwriting Data 
Detailed data for all public offerings of common equity and bonds during 1992-
2002 are obtained from the SDC database. The data also contain information on the gross 
underwriting spreads (total fees paid by the issuer to the underwriters) and the other 
expenses associated with the offerings. As before, we exclude issuers with SIC codes 
starting with 6, 9, 43, 45, and 49 from our sample. Table II provides a summary of 
underwriting deals in our sample broken down by type of financial institutions. 
It is very clear from the sample that investment banks have been losing a 
significant amount of market share to universal banks, both for debt and equity 
underwriting, during our sample period. This trend represents a combination of two 
phenomena: in-roads by commercial banks into the underwriting business, and 
consolidations between investment banks and commercial banks.  
 
 
                                                 
12 As we will show later, banks in fact charge lower spreads and provide larger credit lines for short-term 
revolving lines of credit.   18 
Combining the Datasets 
To link data in the different datasets, by firm, we utilize a unique identification 
number, namely GVKEY, assigned by Compustat to the each firm in its database. This 
unique identification numbering system eliminates the problem associated with changes 
in firms’ names and stock ticker symbols during the study period. It also facilitates our 
matching of financing transaction data from SDC and DealScan with Compustat data on 
firm characteristics and market pricing data in the CRSP database. 
  To associate loan observations to the GVKEY variable in Compustat, we match 
stock ticker information from the DealScan dataset to the ticker variable in Compustat  
and combine data dated for the same quarter and year of the loan date, when available. 
This approach ensures that loan deals are assigned to the current owner of the ticker 
symbol at the time of the loan.
13 However, not all loan deals find a match in Compustat. 
Borrowers that cannot be matched through the easy method are searched manually, by 
name, for a possible match to the Compustat database. For underwriting deals from the 
SDC database, the issuers’ CUSIP numbers are available and can be used to match with 
firms in Compustat. When matching cannot be accomplished using this method, the 
CUSIP numbers of the issuer’s immediate parent or ultimate parent is used to match 
instead.  
  The resulting dataset can be used to track the history of financing transactions of a 
firm by sorting all transactions associated with a particular GVKEY by loan and 
underwriting dates. We have 7,315 firms with “complete” histories of financing 
transactions (i.e., all bank loans and securities offerings from DealScan and SDC) in our 
                                                 
13 More than one firm may use the same ticker symbol at the different point in time.  Care is necessary to 
match the current owner of the symbol (in the DealScan data) with the correct firm in the Compustat data.   19 
final dataset.
14 Once firms are matched, accounting information from Compustat and the 
market equity price from CRSP are added to the final dataset.   
Research Methodology 
Our period of study begins in 1992 (a time at which commercial banks were able 
to underwrite securities to a limited extent as the result of Federal Reserve actions). 
Underwriting limits for commercial banks and “firewall” regulations were relaxed over 
time, and all limits on the amount of underwriting that universal banks could do were 
eliminated in 1999 under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
  Our objective is to study differences in lending terms (price and quantity) and 
underwriting fees among borrowers that use different types of financial intermediaries, 
have different financing needs (that are potentially driven by unobserved firm 
characteristics), and have different banking relationship patterns. We thus classify firms’ 
financing patterns and banking relationship patterns through time. To this end, we 
develop the concept of the “financing window” to capture differences in the dynamics of 
firms’ financing needs, and to separate firm-level effects associated with combinations of 
financings, per se, from the effects of different financial relationship choices and service 
bundling decisions. 
Defining Financing Windows 
To capture the dynamic nature of financing transactions of a firm in a systematic 
way,
15 we define a financing window as a set of transactions that are temporally close 
                                                 
14 In matching loan and underwriting transactions, all observations from databases that can be matched to 
Compustat are included in order to obtain a complete history of financing transactions and matching 
relationships. However, not all transactions can be used in the regressions due to missing data for some 
variables used in those regressions. 
15 Existing studies on the effects of relationships focus their attention on either lending or underwriting 
transactions and define banking relationships surrounding a particular transaction. This approach ignores 
other transactions in the close neighborhood and may affect the conclusion reached about relationships, per   20 
together. Specifically, a window is defined as a cluster of financing events
16 that are at 
most one year apart from their closest neighboring transaction, and for which there are no 
other financing events (outside the window) happening within one year before or after the 
window.
17 Using this definition, the window can have a length ranging from one year 
(with two financing events, one at the beginning and one at the end of the window) to as 
long as the total length of the study period (1992-2002). The vast majority of financing 
windows have a length of less than two years. Table III provides a summary of financing 
windows constructed by this method.
18 The last two rows of the table show the number of 
windows in our dataset broken down by the number of events in the window and the 
average length of the windows (in months). Not surprisingly, most of the windows have a 
pair of events occurring less than one year apart.  This fact explains why varying the 
definition of windows has little effect on our findings. 
Determining Lead Financial Institutions 
The mergers, acquisitions, and reorganizations among financial institutions make 
it difficult to identify all banks/subsidiaries within a bank holding structure through time. 
To overcome this challenge, we develop an additional dataset containing the identities of 
                                                                                                                                                 
se. For example, when a study focuses on a debt underwriting transaction and defines the existing banking 
relationship as any lending transactions prior to the debt underwriting transaction, a fee discount on debt 
underwriting deal may not be a consequence of the existing lending relationship if, for example, there are 
other equity or debt offerings prior to the current debt underwriting deal, as well. That is, the discount may 
be a consequence of prior security offerings that are ignored in the construction of the proxies for banking 
relationship.  We also distinguish between patterns of financing according to the sequence in which various 
transactions occur, as explained in more detail below.  
16 Financial events can be a loan, a debt underwriting, or an equity underwriting. IPOs are included in the 
windows for the purpose of defining an event, but we restrict ourselves to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) 
in our analysis of underwriting fees for equity offerings, for two reasons: (1) some data about firms in years 
preceding their IPOs may not be available; and (2) underwriting costs are much higher for IPOs than for 
SEOs, and are a much smaller fraction of the total cost of the offering, since IPOs also entail significant 
underpricing. 
17 We also defined the financing window with a 6-month events gap, as opposed to one year.  The 
conclusions of the paper are insensitive to that alternative specification. 
18 Because our dataset is left-truncated in 1992, we exclude all windows where the first event we observe 
occurs in 1992, since it is unclear whether those windows actually start in 1992 or at an earlier date.   21 
large bank holding companies, their subsidiaries, and merger histories, in order to 
uniquely identify each financial institution in the dataset through time.
19 We assign a 
unique ID to all banks/subsidiaries within the same holding company.  When mergers 
occur, the IDs are updated to reflect the new holding company.  Similarly, unique IDs are 
assigned to all investment banks in our dataset.  
In addition, several financial institutions usually participate in loan syndications 
or joint security underwriting. However, the degree of participation and the influence in 
deal pricings vary according to their roles in the transaction. We credit a financial 
institution with the transaction only if it has a leading role as the originator or underwriter 
of the transaction. Specifically, the lead lenders for loans are defined as lenders with 
agent title in loan syndication documentation (e.g., managing agent, syndication agent, 
documentation agent, administrative agent) or the party that acts as the lender and 
arranger in non-syndicated loans.  For underwriting deals, we adopt the definition of lead 
managers from the SDC database, where lead managers are defined as those with the role 
of book runner, joint book runner, or joint lead manager. Therefore, it is possible in our 
dataset that a loan or underwriting has multiple lead lenders or lead underwriters, which 
may give rise to ambiguity in defining bank-firm relationship. We devise a robust 
approach to dealing with the potential problem of multiple lead banks about which we 
will elaborate below. 
Constructing Control Variables for Firm Financing Needs 
Having constructed financing windows that define combinations of transactions, 
and their sequence, we proceed to define firm financing needs for each of the events 
                                                 
19 Merger data are available from the BHC database provided at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
website. We also manually verify bank merger history and holding company structure with the website of 
the National Information Center of the Federal Reserve System for accuracy.   22 
within the financing windows (loans, debt offerings, and equity offerings) according to 
the existence of other events within the windows. We use the following six dummy 
variables that are designed to capture patterns of firm financing strategies by describing 
the temporal relationship between the current event and all the other events in the same 
window: PL, PD, PE, SL, SD, and SE. The variables PL, PD, and PE equal one, 
respectively, if there are other loan, debt, or equity events preceding the current event 
within the financing window. SL, SD, and SE equal one, respectively, if there are other 
loan, debt, and equity events subsequent to the current event within the financing 
window. These six dummy variables are clearly defined for each event in a financing 
window regardless of the identities of the lenders/underwriters involved in the event and 
can be used in the regressions to control for unobserved heterogeneity among firms 
related to differences in the patterns of their financial needs, per se.   
Constructing Proxies for Relationship Variables 
In the context of our analysis, we define a relationship between a bank and a firm 
as the repetition of this bank-firm pairing in multiple events within the financing window. 
Therefore, a bank-firm relationship can take the form of repeating loans, repeating debts, 
repeating equities, or any combination of these transactions by this bank-firm pair within 
a window.  
When all of the lead lenders/underwriters for all events within a financing 
window are unique, we identify this window as an unmatched window. In this case, a 
firm uses different lenders/underwriters of all events in the window and there is no 
identifiable relationship in the window. Clearly, a single-event window is an unmatched 
window by definition. A financing window is a matched window when one or more lead   23 
lenders/underwriters in the window (as identified by their unique IDs defined earlier) lead 
more than one transaction within the window. Therefore, it is possible to have several 
relationships embedded within a matched window. Figure 1 provides a diagram depicting 
the classification of events for different type of windows and relationships. 
First, consider the cases of unmatched windows. By construction, all events in the 
unmatched windows are unmatched events. When an unmatched event involves a single 
lead financial institution, the identity and characteristic of the lead institution to be used 
in the regressions are obvious. However, it is less clear when there are multiple lead 
bankers in the event. One possible approach for the regression analysis is to include all 
possible bank-firm pairings from each event in the regressions. For example, a two-event 
window comprised of a loan (with two lead lenders) followed by a debt underwriting 
(with two lead underwriters) creates four possible observations for the regression analysis 
(two observations for loan regressions and two observations for debt regressions). This 
approach essentially double-counts some events, and thus may suffer from non-random 
sampling bias induced by the correlation among observations from the same event. To 
avoid this problem, we deal with unmatched loans with multiple lead institutions by 
randomly assigning a lead institution to each event in order to create a unique bank-firm 
matching. This approach to assigning bank-firm matches to our control (unmatched) 
group does not introduce any systematic bias in measuring the effects of relationships on 
deal pricings, which is evident in our robustness tests (not reported).
20    
                                                 
20 In results not reported here, we perform the following robustness tests for our approach to randomly 
assigning a lead banker to each event. For the first robustness test, we redraw several trials of the random 
assignment of a banker-firm match for the set of unmatched loans. Our regression results are practically 
unchanged from one trial to another. For the second test, we average lender/underwriter characteristics 
across all banks and assign the average value to that event in the regressions. In our specification, the only 
lender/underwriter characteristic used in the regressions is the lending/underwriting market shares. In 
addition to the IB dummy variable, whose value indicates the fact that the event involves exclusively   24 
In a matched window, if only one financial institution is involved in multiple 
events in the window, then there is a unique relationship in this window. We simply 
assign these matched events to the relationship bank in the regressions and discard any 
unmatched events from the analysis. However, when more than one financial institution 
leads (or jointly leads) multiple events in the window, we include only events from the 
financial institution with the strongest relationship in the regressions, where the strength 
of a bank-firm relationship is measured by the number of repeated transactions done by 
that relationship bank within that window.
21  
In 2,377 of our 4,411 matched window observations for loans, we identify unique 
matches within the window (that is, transactions involving a matched bank-firm 
relationship where there is no other bank-firm matching occurring within the window). In 
1,533 other transactions, there is more than one matched relationship within the window, 
but we are able to identify a dominant matched relationship. In the remaining 501 cases 
where more than one institution has the same number of repeated events in the window, 
we randomly select one of the bank-firm relationships as the matched relationship for that 
window. As in the case of the random assignment of unmatched bank-firm relationships, 
this method avoids double counting of matched observations. We test, and confirm, the 
robustness of our reported results to alternative random choices of bank-firm matches, 
                                                                                                                                                 
investment banks, we also include a dummy variable MIX to indicate mixed commercial and investment 
banks deal (the base case regression corresponds to deals that are done exclusively by commercial banks). 
The regression results for these robustness tests are very similar to the ones reported here in the paper. 
21 For an event with multiple lead bankers, it can simultaneously be part of several relationships within a 
window. Therefore, the approach we adopt here in defining the strongest relationship also handles the 
issues that arise from the events with multiple lead financial institutions.   25 
and also to the alternative sampling method of using only the 2,377 unique matches in 
our sample.
22            
Once we identify the strongest relationship bank within the matched windows, we 
define another set of six indicator variables, namely MPL, MPD, MPE, MSL, MSD, and 
MSE, to capture the pattern of matching across transactions within the window. These 
variables, MPL, MPD, MPE, MSL, MSD, and MSE, equal one when the corresponding 
events (i.e. PL, PD, PE, SL, SD, and SE) involve the same financial institution as the one 
in the current event. For instance, MPD as well as PD equals one if the current loan event 
is preceded by a debt offering that is underwritten by the same bank as the current loan. 
Table IV provides descriptions for all twelve relationship variables defined earlier, along 
with the definitions of other variables used in this study.  
Table II in the Appendix provides two examples for matched windows to 
illustrate how the relationship variables are determined. Example 1 illustrates the case 
where there is only one lead banker for each event in a window with multiple 
relationships. Example 2 in the same table illustrates the case of multiple lead bankers 
within a window with multiple relationships. In both examples, bank B is involved in 
three matched transactions compared to two transactions by bank A and one transaction 
by bank C. We therefore include only the observations led by bank B in the regressions 
based on the criteria that bank B has the highest number of repeated events within both 
windows. In particular, we only include the second, the fourth and the fifth events in 
                                                 
22 In Appendix Table III , we present our loan spread regressions where we restrict our samples to include 
only events from unmatched windows and matched windows with a unique bank relationship, to test 
whether our conclusions are sensitive to our specific approach in assigning a relationship bank to a matched 
window with multiple relationships. The regression results in this case are similar to what we report in the 
next section of the paper.   26 
example 1 in the regressions. Whereas, in example 2, we include all three events in the 
regressions but only associate these events to bank B.  
Loan Regressions 
  The endogenous variables of interest for the loan regressions are the loan spread 
(all-in-spread) and the loan amount. We choose a log specification to be consistent with 
positivity of loan spread and quantity and to transform these variables to be closer to a 
normal distribution.
23 As discussed previously, we allow the loan spread and loan amount 
to be determined jointly in the following system of simultaneous equations, where 
equation (1) is the Loan Supply Equation, and equation (2) is the Loan Demand Equation.   
0 1 2 3 4 5 1 1
s s s s s s
i i i i i i i i LNSPREAD REL LEC LOC BC SUP LNAMT b b b b b b g e = + + + + + + +      (1) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 2 2
d d d d d d
i i i i i i i i LNAMT REL LEC LOC BC DEM LNSPREAD b b b b b b g e = + + + + + + + (2), 
where:  
-  LNSPREAD is the natural log of the loan all-in-spread, 
-  LNAMT is the natural log of loan amount,  
-  REL is a vector of dummies for financing needs and relationship variables 
(defined above) which can interact with dummies for the type of financial 
institution, 
-  LEC is a vector of lender characteristics, 
-  LOC is a vector of loan characteristics, 
-  BC is a vector of borrower characteristics, 
-  SUP is a vector of loan supply shifters unrelated to loan demand, and 
-  DEM is a vector of loan demand shifters unrelated to loan supply. 
                                                 
23 Our results are not sensitive to this log transformation. We obtain very similar results using the basis 
point spread and the dollar loan amount.   27 
Crucial to our ability to identify equations (1) and (2) as Loan Supply and Loan 
Demand is our ability to construct plausible measures of SUP and DEM. We include 
variables PRIME and SIC2LENDERSHARE in SUP. The variable PRIME equals one 
when loans are indexed to prime rate instead of other, market-based indexes, such as 
Libor. The variable SIC2LENDERSHARE is the previous year’s lending market share of 
the lender (in the transaction under consideration) to all borrowers with the same first 
two-digit SIC code as the borrower (in the transaction under consideration). This variable 
is constructed based on all loans in DealScan database. Both variables are assumed to 
primarily influence loan supply terms and to be unrelated to demand. Calomiris and 
Pornrojnangkool (2005) and Beim (1996) document a pricing premium for prime-indexed 
loans. In addition, the lenders that acquire lending specialization in a certain industry (as 
captured by the first two-digit SIC code) should be able to price loans to borrowers in 
their specialized industries more competitively.   
We include two measures of lender characteristics (LEC) in both the Loan Supply 
and Loan Demand equations. These are the variables MULTIPLELENDER, and 
LNTOTLENDING. MULTIPLELENDER is an indicator variable for syndicated loan. The 
lead lender in a syndicated loan may have less pricing power due to the fact that other 
members of the syndicate may insist that the loan is priced at market terms. 
LNTOTLENDER is the log of the aggregate amount of lending made by the lead lender 
for a given year. This variable is a proxy for the lender’s reputation and any lender size 
effect. We expect these two LEC variables to have negative impacts on the loan spread. 
For Loan Demand, the variables SALEGROWTH and MVE_BVE (the ratio of the 
market value of equity to the book value equity) are used as proxies for growth and hence   28 
the funding needs of borrowers, which drive demand. We assume that these two variables 
do not influence loan pricing beyond the default risk that has already been captured by 
other control variables in the system with which they may be correlated (which are 
captured, inter alia, by debt ratings and leverage). If these identifying assumptions are 
reasonable, then the coefficients of this system can be consistently estimated using two-
stage least square, where DEM is used to instrument LNAMT in equation (1) and SUP is 
used to instrument LNSPREAD in equation (2). Alternatively, the coefficients of these 
equations can potentially be estimated more efficiently by GMM. In the next section, we 
report the results for both the 2SLS and GMM methods, together with various 
specification tests for the endogeneity of LNAMT and LNSPREAD, the validity of the 
instruments, and the overidentification restrictions.    
  The other control variables used are as follows. REL is a vector of variables which 
consists of the variables PL, PD, PE, SL, SD, SE, MPL, MPD, MPE, MSL, MSD, MSE, 
and their interaction with the variable IB (a dummy variable which equals one is the lead 
financial institution in the event is an investment bank, and zero otherwise).  
  We include the following loan characteristic variables in LOC: LNMATURE, 
TERMB, TERMBSUB, REVOLVER, STREVOLVER, BRIDGE, COMBODEAL, 
PERFPRC, and SECURE, together with the following indicator variables that capture the 
purpose use of loan: TAKEOVER, CAPRESTRUC, CPBACKUP, DEBTREPAY, 
BUYOUT, and WORKCAP. Most of these are standard control variables for loan 
characteristics that are used successfully in previous loan pricing studies (e.g., Calomiris 
and Pornrojnangkool 2005). Their definitions are provided in Table IV, together with the 
rest of the variables used in this paper. One point worth noting is that we distinguish   29 
revolvers of less than one year from revolvers of greater than one year. Bank capital 
regulation requires banks to hold additional capital against undrawn revolvers with a 
maturity greater than one year. We thus expect STREVOLVER to have negative impact on 
loan spread in the Loan Supply Equation. 
  The variables included in BC control for the borrower characteristics that 
influence loan terms. LNASSET is used to capture the effect of borrower size. 
ADJMKTLEVERAGE is the market value measure of leverage, and is adjusted for any 
loan, debt, and equity transactions that have occurred since the last available financial 
statements, in order to better reflect the borrower’s riskiness at the time of the loan event. 
We use the market value of equity instead of the book value of equity in the calculation 
of leverage. We also include dummies for S&P’s long-term senior credit ratings in the 
regressions. Roughly one-third of our observations have no rating data. We employ an 
ordered Probit model to impute credit ratings for observations where no rating data are 
available.
24 The indicator variable RATEFORE, which indicates whether ratings are 
forecasted by the model rather than provided by the ratings agency, is included to capture 
any systematic difference between firms that are rated and firms that are not. 
Debt Underwriting Regression 
  We estimate the following, non-structural regression for total debt underwriting 
spreads, where total spreads include management fees, underwriting fees, selling 
concessions, and other direct expenses related to the administration and marketing of the 
offering. We include these direct expenses into the definition of underwriting spreads to 
better reflect total costs associated with security offerings. 
                                                 
24 The Appendix includes the results of the ordered probit model used in this study. The results from the 
loan spread and loan amount regressions on the clean sample where observations with no rating 
information are excluded are similar to the ones reported here. Thus we do not reported them in the paper.    30 
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D D D D D
i i i i i i LNDSPREAD REL DBC DFC DIC b b b b b e = + + + + + .  (3) 
LNDSPREAD is the natural log of the debt underwriting spread relative to the amount of 
proceeds raised, expressed in basis points of the total amount of proceeds. REL is defined 
similarly to the way it was defined in the loan regressions. DBC is a vector of underwriter 
(bank) characteristics, which is comprised of MULTIPLEBANKER and 
LNTOTDEBTUNDERWRITING. They are defined similarly to the control variables for 
lender characteristics (LEC) in the Loan Supply equation, but are specific to the debt 
underwriting market. DFC is a vector of firm characteristics, which includes the log of 
firm assets (LNASSET), a market-value measure of adjusted leverage 
(ADJMKTLEVERAGE) defined similarly to the measure used in the loan regressions, and 
an indicator variable for an investment grade-rated firm (INVGRADE).
25 Lastly, we 
include debt issue characteristics in DIC, namely LNMATURE, LNAMT, REPAYBANK, 
REFINDEBT, ACQLOB, MTNPROG, FLOAT, SHELFREG, CALLABLE, PUTTABLE, 
LISTED, and COMPBID. Their definitions are presented in Table IV.   
Equity Underwriting Regression 
  We employ similarly specified regressions for the equity underwriting spread, as 
shown below. 
  0 1 2 3 4 3 ,
E E E E E
i i i i i i LNESPREAD REL EBC EFC EIC b b b b b e = + + + + +   (4) 
LNESPREAD is the log of the equity underwriting spread. REL is the vector of financing 
needs and relationship variables defined previously. EBC is defined similarly to DBC in 
the debt regression but is specific to the equity underwriting market. We include 
                                                 
25 Calomiris and Himmelberg (1999) use these firm-level observable characteristics to estimate equity 
underwriting costs. They use these cost estimates as proxies for external financing costs and explore their 
impacts on the investment behavior of firms.   31 
LNASSET, ADJMKTLEVERAGE, RATED, INVGRADE, LNMVE, and VOLATILITY in 
the vector of firm characteristics EFC. Volatility of equity is calculated from the previous 
250-day daily equity returns, looking back from the offering date. The issue 
characteristics (e.g., LNAMT, REPAYBANK, REFINDEBT, ACQLOB and SHELFREG) 
are included in the vector of issue characteristics (EIC).  
4. Empirical Results 
Loan Supply Specifications 
  Table VI presents the estimates of the Loan Supply equation (1). In this 
specification, we postulate that LNSPREAD and LNAMT are determined simultaneously, 
as described in the previous section. Model A presents two-stage least squares estimates 
of LNSPREAD regression in which financing needs and relationship variables (REL) do 
not interact with the investment bank indicator variable (IB). Model B allows REL to 
interact with IB. Using SALEGROWTH and MVE_BVE as instruments for LNAMT in this 
regression seems to work well. At the bottom of the table, we display results for tests of 
the significance of these instruments in the first-stage regression of LNAMT on all 
exogenous variables. Individually and jointly, these instruments are correlated with 
LNAMT.  We also implement a Hausman (1978) procedure to test the null hypothesis that 
instruments are exogenous. In doing so, we regress the residual from the second-stage 
regression on the list of all exogenous variables and construct a test statistic (N times the 
R-squared from this residual regression, where N is number of observations in the 
regression). The test statistic has an asymptotic distribution of Chi-Square with 1 degree 
of freedom (the number of instruments minus endogenous variables). As shown in the   32 
overidentification tests in the table, the value of the test statistic is 0.36 for model A and 
0.25 for model B, indicating that one cannot reject the null of instruments exogeneity.  
  In addition, we utilize the instruments to test for the endogeneity of LNAMT in the 
spread regression. If LNAMT is exogenous in the spread equation, then ordinary least 
squares and two-stage least squares estimates of all coefficients should differ only by 
sampling error. The test is implemented by first regressing LNAMT on all exogenous 
variables to obtain its residual. Then, we add the residuals from this regression to the 
spread regression (1) to obtain the OLS estimate. The t-statistic of the residual term in 
this augmented spread regression can be used as a test statistic for the null hypothesis that 
LNAMT is exogenous. Our t statistic has a value of -12.84 for model A, and -11.77 for 
model B. Thus, we clearly reject the null hypothesis that LNAMT is exogenous.  
In our sample, it is interesting to see how the coefficient of LNAMT from the two-
stage least squares estimate differs from the coefficient from the ordinary least squares 
estimate, which is not shown here. The coefficient for LNAMT in the ordinary least 
squares regression is significantly negative whereas the coefficient for LNAMT in the 
two-stage least squares regression is positive and significant. Since we interpret our 
spread regression as a Loan Supply equation (by including supply shifter variables (SUP) 
in the equation), we expect an upward sloping supply curve (a positive coefficient for 
LNAMT ). The ordinary least squares estimator clearly is not consistent and suffers from 
simultaneity bias. This result therefore confirms the validity of our approach in modeling 
Loan Supply and Loan Demand as a simultaneous system of equations.      
  The coefficients for most variables in the Loan Supply equation are of the 
expected signs and significant. Having multiple lenders (MULTIPLELENDER)   33 
participating in the syndication significantly reduces the costs of borrowing. Larger and 
more diversified lenders (LNTOTLENDING) can lend to borrowers at lower costs. Loan 
characteristics also affect loan pricing in expected ways. In tranch B term loans 
(TERMB), where lenders carry lower seniority than other lenders in the same term loan, 
loan pricing is higher. The pricing premium is even greater for loans in lower tranches 
(TERMBSUB). Revolvers carry lower spreads than term loans (tranch A) and short-term 
revolvers have even greater discounts, perhaps reflecting the lower regulatory capital 
required for short-term revolvers. The indicator variable SECURE is significantly 
positive, as found in previous studies. This reflects unobserved (higher) riskiness of 
borrowers that borrow in the form of secured loans. In addition, borrowers are charged 
higher rates when term and revolving loans are packaged together in one deal 
(COMBODEAL). We document a substantial PRIME premium in our sample, as found in 
Beim (1996). The coefficient for SIC2LENDINGSHARE is also significant and negative 
in our sample as expected, reflecting cost savings from sectoral specialization. In our 
sample, the discount for “performance pricing” of loans is significant but smaller than the 
discount reported in prior studies (e.g., Beatty and Weber 2000).  We also include time 
and industry dummies, which are omitted from the table.  
Table VII presents a GMM estimator for the Loan Supply equation, where we 
utilize the cross-equation correlation of the error terms in the estimation and allow for a 
general form of heteroskedasticity. The GMM estimator is asymptotically more efficient 
if the model is correctly specified. The results are remarkably similar.  
 
   34 
Effects of the Patterns of Financing Needs and Relationships on Loan Prices 
  As we discussed in our review of the literature, one potential shortcoming of 
existing studies is their insufficient controls for heterogeneity among borrowers. In 
particular, unobserved heterogeneity may drive patterns of borrowers’ financing needs, 
which in turn may influence loan pricing, and may be correlated with relationship 
indicator variables. Thus, omitting financing pattern variables from the regressions can 
make estimates inconsistent and provide misleading estimates of the effects of bundling 
on loan pricing.  In our regressions, we include variables PL, PD, PE, SL, SD, and SE as 
proxies for unobservable heterogeneity.  
We find several consistent results across our specifications, which indicate the 
importance of controlling for financing patterns. First, with regard to loan supply effects, 
loans that occur around the time of debt offerings receive pricing discounts from both 
universal and investment banks, regardless of whether the lender and underwriter are 
matched (the coefficients of PD and SD are negative). Interestingly, we do not find the 
same result for loans around the time of equity offerings. This finding is consistent with a 
“road-show” effect, in which information regarding creditworthiness of borrowers is 
transmitted to the market surrounding a debt offering in a way that reduces information 
gathering costs for the surrounding loans.
26 Second, a loan that is followed by another 
loan (SL) is priced slightly higher than a single loan. This occurs regardless of whether 
the loans are matched or not. Third, investment banks price loans significantly higher 
than universal banks, in general (the coefficient for IB is positive and significant). 
                                                 
26 A somewhat similar result is found in Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998), which finds a reduction in 
interest rates on loans following the public listing of a firm in Italy. They interpret this finding as either 
reflecting the result of the improved information related to a new stock listing, per se, or improvements in 
the bargaining power of the borrower as the result of the change in the status of the firm.    35 
Investment banks’ loan spreads are about 8% higher in model A, ceteris paribus, and the 
effect is even larger (11%) in model B, where we allow the IB interactions. This finding 
indicates that investment banks suffer a basic cost disadvantage relative to commercial 
banks in originating loans. It is possible that commercial banks’ special access to the 
payment system reduces their costs of originating loans.
27 
Turning to the supply-side effects of bundling lending and underwriting, our 
results for matched loans (whose lenders also underwrite other transactions within the 
same financing windows) differ from the results of existing studies. Matched loans, 
whose lenders provide other loans or underwrite other debt issues within the same 
financing windows, are priced similarly to unmatched loans, ceteris paribus. That finding 
is consistent with the study of Fraser, Hebb and MacKinnon (2005) for the matching of 
loans and debt underwritings. For loans that are matched to equity underwritings, we find 
that matching has differing effects on loan pricing depending on the sequencing of the 
transactions and the identities of the lenders. If matched loans occur before equity 
underwritings, both universal banks and investment banks price these loans significantly 
higher than their unmatched counterparts. However, if loans are granted after matched 
equity offerings, then there is a loan pricing discount that only investment banks provide.  
Drucker and Puri (2005) utilize different econometric techniques in their analysis 
and report evidence that only universal banks (not investment banks) provide discounts 
for loans to the borrowers who also use their equity underwriting services around the 
                                                 
27 At least two possible influences may be important. First, the payment system may afford special 
information to banks about borrowers by virtue of the fact that banks can monitor debits and credits 
flowing in and out of the firm’s accounts. A second possibility, which applies to revolving lines of credit, is 
that linking the line with a checking account may economize on transaction costs of accessing the line.  
  Our finding that investment banks charge more than commercial banks for loans raises the 
question of why a borrower would borrow from an investment bank, despite this higher cost. Part of the 
answer may relate to search and switch costs, which make it costly to ascertain the prices that alternative 
intermediaries would charge for loans.   36 
time of loans. They interpret their findings to be consistent with the existence of 
economies of scope between the joint production of loans and underwritings, whose 
benefits are passed on to borrowers in the form of a loan pricing discount. In their study, 
however, they do not include our controls, model lending structurally, or consider 
differences in loan pricing that result from differences in the sequences of loans and 
equity offerings. Our results indicate that such distinctions result in qualitative 
differences in estimated effects of bundling. 
Our finding of a loan pricing premium preceding matched equity underwritings 
does not support the notion that universal banks underprice their loans to win future 
security underwriting business. Quite the opposite. Perhaps underwriters utilize their 
ongoing equity underwriting relationship to over-price loans that immediately precede 
equity offerings. Typically, equity underwritings are lengthy and complex processes. It is 
not uncommon for a successful equity underwriting to take more than one year from 
inception to completion. Therefore, it is possible that matched preceding loans are 
granted after the firm has decided to underwrite equity. Because the debt underwriting 
process is less complex and debt offerings are substitutes for loan, it may be more 
difficult for debt underwriters to leverage their underwriting relationships to increase 
their spreads in the lending market. Contrary to some of the concerns voiced in the debate 
over tying, discussed above, our findings suggest that banks do not tend to discount loans 
to encourage clients to bring them underwriting business.  
Our finding that loan pricing discounts are offered only by investment banks, and 
only when loans are preceded by matched equity underwritings, is consistent with the 
notion that investment banks suffer cost disadvantages relative to commercial banks in   37 
providing loans (i.e., the positive coefficient for the IB indicator). Investment banks may 
compete with universal banks in the loan market by providing “rebates” through loan 
pricing discounts only for loans that are closed after matched equity offerings. In this 
regard, it is interesting to note that the coefficients on IB (0.11) and IB_MPE (-0.19) are 
of similar magnitude.   
It is clear from our findings thus far that loan pricing in the presence of an 
underwriting relationship does not merely reflect the physical scope economies between 
lending and underwriting, as previous studies have posited. Banks also utilize loan 
pricing in a strategic way to extract value from existing relationship with firms (by 
selectively charging “premiums”), and also as a tool to compete with competitors (by 
selectively offering “rebates”). 
Universal banks seem to enjoy cost advantages in providing loans, in general. 
This may explain universal banks’ growing share of the underwriting market. So long as 
there are either expected savings to customers from bundling (which can take the form of 
initial discounts to attract clients, partly offset by rent extraction in later years through the 
charging of loan premia, as in Rajan 1922, or better price performance on securities 
offerings, or physical, non-pecuniary savings of transaction costs to customers from 
bundling), and as long as universal banks can perform underwriting services as 
effectively as investment banks, then universal banks should attract a growing share of 
the underwriting and lending markets. Given the fact that most universal banks acquired 
existing investment banking franchises to participate in the underwriting market, there is 
no obvious reason to presume that universal banks are not able to underwrite securities as 
effectively as investment banks. Below, we investigate that question empirically.   38 
The GMM estimates for the effects of the patterns of financing needs and 
relationships variables on Loan Supply equation are similar to 2SLS estimates and are 
presented in Table VII. Our instruments pass a GMM overidentification test, which 
confirms our choice of instruments.  
Loan Demand Specifications 
Two-stage least squares estimates of the Loan Demand equation are presented in 
models C to E in Table VI. The sign of LNSPREAD is negative and significant, 
confirming the demand interpretation of the equation. Our instruments for LNSPREAD 
also work well. In the first-stage regression, PRIME and SIC2LENDINGSHARE are very 
significant instruments in explaining LNSPREAD, as shown in the test statistics at the 
bottom of the table. In addition, we can not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments 
are exogenous in the overidentification test, which validates our choices of instruments. 
Our demand shifter variables (SALEGROWTH and MVE_BVE) are both positive 
and significant. A higher growth firm has higher loan demand. Borrowers with higher 
loan demand use larger lenders and often use loan syndication.  Borrowers who use lower 
tranch loans (TERMB and TERMBSUB) tend to have higher demand for funds. Revolvers 
typically are associated with larger loan size than standard term loans. Borrowers who are 
willing to have their loans secured tend to have larger demand for credit than those who 
do not secure their loans. Borrowers tend to demand larger loans when the loans are for a 
specific purpose such as a takeover loan, a capital restructuring loan, or a debt repayment. 
Borrowers with better credit ratings tend to have less demand for credit, and more 
leveraged borrowers tend to have higher demand for credit. We include time and industry 
dummies, which are omitted from the table. Results are similar using a GMM estimator   39 
and the instruments for LNSPREAD in the Loan Demand regression pass GMM 
overidentification tests. 
Effects of Patterns of Financing Needs and Relationships on Loan Demand 
  For the variables that capture patterns of financial need, we find that firms that 
recently issued debts (PD) have lower demand for loans, and that firms that recently 
issued equities or plan to issue equities (PE or SE) have higher demand for loans 
regardless of whether the loans are matched. 
For relationship variables, we observe consistently negative signs for the 
coefficients of matched loans regardless of which particular transactions are matched 
with these loans (i.e., negative signs for MPL, MPD, MPE, MSL, MSD, and MSE). In 
model E, we restrict the model by requiring that all relationship dummies are equal (as 
shown in MATCH and IB_MATCH variables at the bottom of the table). These results 
indicates that bundling, in general, is associated with lower loan demand. This holds for 
both universal banks and investment banks.  We interpret this result as lending support to 
the Ramirez (1995) view that universal banking relationships can provide liquidity 
insurance to firms in the form of implicit lines of credit that reduce their need to maintain 
explicit lines of credit. Borrowers who maintain close relationships with their banks (as 
reflected in matched transactions) thus enjoy cost savings from reduced fees on unused 
credit lines.  
Loan Regressions Robustness Tests 
  We perform several tests for the robustness of our loan regressions. First, we 
exclude commercial paper backups and term loans from our loan regressions (i.e., we 
include only revolvers). The results are similar to the previous results and are shown in   40 
Table VIII. Second, we exclude commercial paper backup loans altogether from the 
original DealScan dataset when we define financing windows and matched loans. The 
results for this restricted sample are qualitatively similar to the full sample and revolver 
loans results, and thus we do not show them here. Additionally, we estimate loan demand 
and supply equations allowing IBs and universal banks to have different demand and 
supply schedules (i.e., allowing endogenous variables to interact with the IB dummy). 
The interaction terms are not significant, thus we do not explore this specification further. 
Sub-Samples Analysis 
  Table IX presents the GMM estimates of spread regressions broken down by time 
and borrower sales.
28 The evidence of a loan pricing premium on loans that precede 
matched equity transactions holds when we split our sample pre- and post-1998, but 
results are more significant post-1998, which corresponds to the period when the Glass-
Steagall Act was no longer in effect. This pricing premium applies across the borrower 
size spectrum, although the coefficients for MSE are not significant for the smallest size 
borrowers (with less than $250 million in annual sales) and the largest size borrowers 
(with more than $10 billion in annual sales). This finding is consistent with our previous 
interpretation that the MSE premium reflects bank quasi rent extraction by virtue of their 
relationships. In our sample, there are few MSE transactions for the smallest size category 
of borrowers, which can explain the larger standard errors for that coefficient. For the 
largest borrowers, we hypothesize that the underwriting market is highly competitive 
(i.e., lenders lack significant private information about these borrowers) so that banks 
seeking to exploit their relationships to extract quasi rents (as in Rajan 1992) would fail 
because they have no market power in the lending market.  
                                                 
28 The results are similar for the two-stage least squares estimators.   41 
The sign for the coefficients of IB*MPE is consistently negative pre- and post-
1998 and across borrower sizes. However, the coefficients are significant only for the 
post-1998 period and for large borrowers (those with annual sales more than $1 billion). 
This finding is also consistent with the hypothesis that investment banks suffer cost 
disadvantages relative to universal banks in providing loans, and therefore, are forced to 
compete in the loan market by providing “rebates” of their underwriting fees in the form 
of pricing discounts for loans that follow equity offerings. Since this “rebate” is costly, it 
is logical for them to offer it only when they have to do so (i.e., on deals where revenue is 
large, and for which the competition from universal banks is strongest – namely loans to 
large borrowers).  
Debt Spread Regressions 
  Both our debt and equity underwriting spread regressions, shown in Table X, have 
high explanatory power, as is evident from the adjusted R-squareds of 0.78 and 0.74 for 
the debt and equity underwriting spread regressions, respectively. Our control variables 
in the debt underwriting spread regressions shown in Table X have the expected signs 
and most are significant. Large underwriters (LNTOTDEBTUNDERWRITING) appear to 
be able to underwrite debt issues more efficiently and at lower cost, although it is also 
possible that the underwriter size effect reflects unobserved heterogeneity of clients 
(riskier, and therefore, hard-to-underwrite firms may be attracted to smaller 
underwriters). Larger firm size (LNASSET) is associated with reduced underwriting costs 
for debt issuers. Higher leverage (ADJMKTLEVERAGE) is associated with higher 
underwriting costs, while having long-term debt rated as investment grade (INVGRADE) 
reduces underwriting costs. In addition, the underwriting costs are lower when the   42 
proceeds of the debt offerings are used for existing debt repayments or refinancings 
(REPAYBANK or REFINDEBT). Having floating interest debt (FLOAT), being registered 
in an MTN program (MTNPROG), or using a competitive bidding process (COMPBID) 
for selecting underwriters reduces underwriting costs. Finally, more complex debt 
structures such as callable and puttable features (CALLABLE and PUTTABLE) increase 
underwriting costs for the issues. 
    With respect to bundling, we find that debt offering transactions that are 
matched with loans are associated with higher spreads than unmatched counterparts (i.e., 
we find significantly positive coefficients for MPL and MSL) for both universal and 
investment banks. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that relationship banks 
can extract value from their relationships. In this context, banks extract value from 
relationships in the form of higher underwriting fees for matched loan and debt 
transactions. Recall the results from the loan regressions, where we found significant 
discounts for loans surrounding debt offerings due to a “road show” effect, whether these 
loans are matched or not. Therefore, for matched debt and loan transactions, borrowers 
pay less of an interest spread for their loans but the discounts are offset to some extent by 
higher debt underwriting costs. In addition, we find that issuers pay less when debt 
offerings are done consecutively, which we see as a variation on the “road show” effect. 
Interestingly, we also find that, in general, it costs more to use specialized investment 
banks than universal banks to underwrite debts.  
Equity Spread Regressions 
  As in the debt regressions, we find that larger underwriters underwrite equity at 
lower costs (LNTOTEQUNDERWRITING). Using joint underwriters   43 
(MULTIPLEBANKER) increases total underwriting costs. We also find that market 
capitalization (LNMVE), asset size (LNASSET), and the size of the equity offering 
(LNAMT) are associated with significantly reduced underwriting costs, whereas leverage 
(ADJMKTLEVERAGE) and equity volatility (VOLATILITY) are associated with higher 
underwriting costs for equity offerings. The negative coefficient for SHELFREG and the 
positive coefficient for ACQLOB are similar to those in the debt spread regressions.  
  With respect to the relationship variables, we find two results that are similar to 
the debt underwriting regressions. First, investment banks in general underwrite equity 
offerings at higher costs than universal banks, ceteris paribus (i.e., there is a significantly 
positive coefficient for IB). Second, when there are matched loans surrounding equity 
offerings, both universal banks and investment banks underwrite the issues at higher 
costs than unmatched transactions. This finding together with the finding of a positive 
coefficient for MSE in the loan spread regressions provide consistent evidence that both 
universal and investment banks are able to extract value from their banking relationships 
through higher loan and underwriting spreads in the matched windows in which loans are 
followed by equity offerings. (Recall that we find a significant negative coefficient for 
IB*MPE in the loan spread regressions.) It appears that investment banks provide a loan 
pricing “rebate” after they capture an underwriting fee premium for matched transactions. 
The debt and equity underwriting spread regression results from the sub-samples 
are similar to those for the whole sample reported above, and thus we do not report them.        
5. Conclusions 
  We investigate how the formation of banking relationships, and the bundling of 
financial services that occurs within those relationships, affect the pricing of loans and   44 
the underwriting costs of issuing securities. In particular, we investigate the alleged 
practice of loan under-pricing as a means for universal banks to compete more effectively 
as underwriters. In doing so, we revisit the existing literature that uses micro-level loan 
and underwriting data to investigate the costs and benefits of the joint production of loans 
and security underwritings within the context of relationship banking.  
  Our research methodology addresses several shortcomings in previous studies. 
First, we incorporate important control variables into the analysis of the effects of 
relationships on pricing, and in particular, we consider the pricing of financial 
transactions within the context of the sequential patterns of financing transactions 
undertaken by firms (the “financing window” of the firm). Firm and deal characteristics, 
as well as the sequencing of transactions, turn out to be important sources of firm 
heterogeneity, and incorporating these effects has significant consequences for measuring 
the effects of relationships on pricing. We construct a dataset that captures nearly 
complete financing transaction histories for 7,315 firms comprising loan, debt, and equity 
transactions for the period of 1992 to 2002. Second, we explicitly identify the effects of 
bundling on loan supply by imposing identifying restrictions on supply and demand that 
allow us to estimate loan supply and loan demand functions.  Third, we consider the 
pricing of several financial services supplied within financial relationships, including 
loan pricing, debt underwriting costs, and equity underwriting costs.  
  All of our regressions have high explanatory power.  We report several interesting 
findings. First, our findings contradict other studies that had found evidence that 
universal banks under-price loans to gain an in-road into the underwriting market. Our   45 
findings, therefore, also imply that concerns about loan underpricing as part of a strategy 
of illegal tying on the part of universal banks may not be warranted.   
Second, we find evidence of strategic aspects of the pricing of loans and 
underwriting services. Banks are able to use their valuable relationships to over-price 
loans (as predicted by Rajan 1992) that precede equity underwritings. We also find 
pricing premiums for both debt and equity underwriting services that are matched with 
loans within the same financing windows. Investment banks have different pricing 
strategies than universal banks, reflecting the fact that investment banks apparently 
operate at a cost disadvantage with respect to universal banks. That is, controlling for 
other differences, investment banks price loans, and debt and equity underwriting 
services, higher than universal banks. The cost disadvantage of investment banks may 
explain why they price bundled transactions somewhat differently from universal banks, 
too. Investment banks compete with universal banks in the loan market by providing loan 
pricing discounts as “rebates” to borrowers who had employed them in preceding equity 
underwriting transactions.  
Our findings that banks appear to be able to extract quasi rents from their 
relationships (charge premium on loans and underwritings) might seem to imply that 
relationships are harmful to bank customers, but that is not the case. Unless there are 
substantial benefits accruing to the borrowers from forming relationships and choosing to 
bundle transactions, relationship banks should not be able to extract quasi rents from their 
relationships through pricing premiums in bundled transactions. In the Rajan (1992) 
model, customers freely choose and benefit from relationship formation, and receive up-
front concessions early on in their banking relationships which compensate for the quasi   46 
rents banks later extract. Furthermore, relationships can entail benefits for customers 
other than initial price discounts on loans and underwritings at the time of relationship 
formation. One possibility is that bundling economizes on transaction costs (saved “face 
time,” for example). Another possibility is that richer banking relationships increase the 
prices of debt and equity securities underwritten by bankers.
29 Still another possibility is 
that relationships may reduce the need for some bank services. Our results from the 
estimation of Loan Demand suggests that bundling may reduce the demand for loans, 
possibly because stronger relationships entail an implicit “credit line,” which substitutes 
for an explicit one. That reduction in the demand for credit could result in substantial 
interest savings.  
A more fundamental implication of our findings about the strategic pricing of 
financial services is that empirical models of loan pricing and underwriting need to take 
bank strategies into account, and not presume that physical scope economies will 
necessarily be reflected in pricing decisions. Observed prices do not merely reflect the 
cost functions of banks.    
  Third, we find evidence of “road show” effects for debt underwritings. The 
similarity between the information produced in debt underwriting and loans seems to 
result in pricing discounts for loans that occur near debt issues, and this result holds for 
both universal and investment banks, whether the loans are bundled with the offerings 
                                                 
29 Our future research will investigate the effects of banking relationship on the pricing performance of the 
securities underwritten by these banks (i.e., whether the market pays higher prices for the debts and equities 
underwritten by relationship banks) using the same framework to control for other aspects of transactions 
as in the current paper. In addition, our future research will extend this methodology to event studies that 
measure the impact of banking relationship on the abnormal returns of seasoned equity and debt 
underwritings.    47 
(matched with the same bank) or not. In addition, and similarly, we find that consecutive 
debt offering have lower underwriting costs than stand alone debt offerings.  
   From the conclusions of this study, several questions remain and should be 
addressed by further research. In particular, more investigation is warranted of the 
possible advantages that customers receive from bundling, which could take the form of 
improved prices on debt and equity securities, transaction costs savings that accompany 
bundling, and possible savings from implicit “credit lines.” Second, further study is 
needed to understand the relative efficiency of universal banks as compared with 
investment banks – that is, why do investment banks systematically charge higher interest 
rates on loans and higher fees for their underwriting services? The key difference 
between the two intermediaries is the access to deposits and the payment system enjoyed 
by commercial banks (which may provide favorable information processing capabilities 
about borrowers, and lower transaction costs for providing revolving lines of credit), as 
well as their access to the government safety net (i.e., deposit insurance, and access to 
Fed overdrafts and the discount window).  
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# .￿￿/￿￿! ￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 &4 ,4 ,4 ,4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,4 (4 ,4 &4 &4 ,4 ,4 ,4 &4 ,4 -4 ,4
7 ￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿+ ￿￿8￿# .￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 -4 -4 -4 &4 (4 $ 4 0 4 ,,4 % 4 ,(4 ,&4 0 4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 1 4 -4 &4 ,0 4 % 4 ,) 4 ,) 4 &1 4 &1 4 (&4 &1 4 ,% 4
/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ) 4 ’4 ’4 (4 ’4 ’4 ) 4 ) 4 ’4 $ 4 ’4 ’4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 (4 &4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 &4 ,4 ,4
,% % & ,% % ( ,% % ’ ,% % ) ,% % $ ,% % 0 ,% % 1 ,% % % &--- &--, &--& ￿￿￿￿￿
.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 &4 &4 &4 &4 &4 ,4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,4 (4 -4 &4 ,4 &4 ’4 ’4 (4 $ 4 $ 4 (4
($ ’￿￿￿! ￿9￿￿￿￿￿￿! 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,4 ’4 0 4 $ 4 ’4 $ 4 % 4 ,&4 ,$ 4 ,0 4 ,1 4 ,-4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,&4 ,) 4 &,4 ,0 4 ,,4 ,’4 &1 4 ($ 4 ’&4 ($ 4 ’’4 &1 4
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ’4 ’4 (4 &4 &4 &4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 &4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 -4 &4 &4 &4 &4 &4 -4 ,4
￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 -4 -4 -4 -4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 &4 &4 ,4 ,4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 ,4 -4 ,4 ,4 -4 -4
/￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ) 4 ’4 (4 &4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ’4 (4 (4 &4 (4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 &4 &4 ,4 ,4 ,4
:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 $ 0 4 $ $ 4 $ ) 4 $ % 4 0 ,4 $ 0 4 $ ,4 ) &4 ) ,4 ) &4 ) -4 $ -4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 0 &4 0 ,4 $ % 4 0 (4 0 1 4 0 ,4 ’% 4 ’-4 (1 4 ’’4 () 4 ) ) 4
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 &&4 &,4 &,4 ,% 4 &,4 &&4 &$ 4 &% 4 &$ 4 &(4 &$ 4 &’4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,’4 % 4 % 4 0 4 1 4 % 4 ,$ 4 ,$ 4 ,&4 ,-4 ,(4 ,,4
,% % & ,% % ( ,% % ’ ,% % ) ,% % $ ,% % 0 ,% % 1 ,% % % &--- &--, &--& ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ’&4 ($ 4 &$ 4 ,1 4 &’4 &(4 ,% 4 ,) 4 0 4 1 4 0 4 ,1 4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 (4 &4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,4 -4 -4 ,4 -4 ,4
￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ) 1 4 $ ’4 0 ’4 1 &4 0 $ 4 0 0 4 1 ,4 1 ) 4 % (4 % &4 % (4 1 &4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 % 0 4 % 1 4 % % 4 % % 4 % % 4 % % 4 % % 4 ,--4 ,--4 % % 4 ,--4 % % 4
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿.; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ "
# ￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿# % ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ # ￿￿&￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿*; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿

















￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿=/5 ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’(￿￿’) ￿￿￿￿￿’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,% % &￿￿&--&￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ,% % & ,% % ( ,% % ’ ,% % ) ,% % $ ,% % 0 ,% % 1 ,% % % &--- &--, &--& ￿￿￿￿￿
 ￿￿￿ .￿￿+ ￿￿/￿￿! 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,-4 ,,4 ,(4 &-4 &&4 ,$ 4 (’4 ((4 (1 4 ’0 4 ) 1 4 &$ 4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 0 4 0 4 0 4 ,&4 ,$ 4 ,) 4 &’4 (,4 (’4 ’1 4 ) 0 4 &1 4
# .￿￿/￿￿! 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 % -4 1 % 4 1 0 4 1 -4 0 1 4 1 ’4 $ $ 4 $ $ 4 $ -4 ’% 4 () 4 0 &4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 % (4 % (4 % (4 1 1 4 1 ’4 1 ) 4 0 ’4 $ 0 4 $ (4 ’’4 &1 4 $ 1 4
7 ￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿+ ￿￿8￿# .￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 ,4 ,4 &4 ’4 1 4 ,4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 &4 &4 (4 0 4 ,) 4 ’4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’,0 ) ,, (,) (% 0 ) $ ) $ ) 0 0 ’% ’-( (-1 ’-, (’- ) ￿-$ (
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿￿3 .￿￿￿￿￿￿5 0 - 1 ’ ’’ ) 1 0 1 1 ’ ,,’ ,,’ ,-- ,$ % ,&& ,￿-(%
=< ￿￿￿! .￿￿+ ￿￿/￿￿! 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 -4 ,4 (4 (4 ) 4 ,&4 &% 4 &0 4 ((4 (-4 (-4 ,(4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 -4 &4 ’4 (4 (4 1 4 &$ 4 &&4 &-4 ,1 4 &-4 ,(4
# .￿￿/￿￿! 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,--4 % % 4 % 0 4 % 0 4 % ) 4 1 0 4 0 -4 0 &4 $ &4 $ ,4 $ ’4 1 $ 4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ,--4 % 1 4 % $ 4 % 0 4 % $ 4 % -4 0 &4 0 ) 4 $ % 4 $ &4 0 &4 1 &4
7 ￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿+ ￿￿8￿# .￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 ,4 &4 ) 4 1 4 $ 4 ,4
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿3 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 -4 -4 -4 -4 ,4 ,4 &4 (4 ,-4 &-4 1 4 ) 4
=< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ $ ( 1 1 ’ 0 -) 1 &- ,￿,’, 1 ) 1 ) (, 0 ’( $ ’% (,- &% ) 0 ￿) % %
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿￿3 .￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ($ ’1 () ) $ 1 , $ $ $ ’ ,,, ,&) $ ) ’% 0 ($
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ " "






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿  3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿5
￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿= 3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿=< ￿￿￿! 5

















￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5
￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿  3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿5
￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿= 3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿=< 5

















￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
# . ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+
￿2￿/￿￿=2 # 2> ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿
￿2￿/￿ =.￿￿2 =:A:# ￿# 2> ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿
￿2￿/￿=E￿2 =:A:# ￿# 2> ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿
C￿￿￿# ￿￿=.*2?=: ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
C￿￿￿# ￿￿=￿=2 =: ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿# ￿& =.￿￿2 =:A:# ￿=:￿G*:=
4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿# ￿&=E￿2 =:A:# ￿=:￿G*:=
4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿# ￿&￿=2 # 2>￿G*:= 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/￿￿￿ ’￿& ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿￿ +￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿- ￿ ￿￿￿ 0 ￿ 1￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ / ￿ & ￿ (￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿



























*￿E￿/. ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
.:#  >= ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿*￿￿*.￿= ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿/C./ =*￿
￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿
￿/C￿.#   ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
9￿/*￿ ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿# ￿￿=  ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿2C*￿￿:= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿:=6/￿6=: ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿! ￿￿￿
C￿2￿:/> ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿*.￿= ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
:=9# 2 =.￿ ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
:=￿*@.*2? ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿=￿￿:= ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿G=￿9:=> ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿./: # 2*￿= ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿=:C. ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿=:C.￿￿. ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.
￿=:9 ￿:￿ ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5
* 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>=
3 ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 D 3 ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿I￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿< ￿￿￿! I￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿! 5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿:*￿￿=￿J * ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿D ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿::*￿# / ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
9A￿J ? ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿D ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
# 2￿J  =.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿D ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
# 2￿￿/6=: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
# 26>:* = ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿...￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
# 26￿￿:2￿ ￿￿￿￿￿D ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
# 26￿￿:2￿ ￿￿￿￿￿D ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
?J * ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿D ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿2*C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿2*￿￿=￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿2C6= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿!
E￿# ￿?:*￿# / < ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿







C6=J .6= ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿! D ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿!
￿￿ J * ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿D ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ =.￿/6=: =.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿D ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿:=6/￿6=: ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿! ￿￿￿
6/￿ ￿< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿ ’￿& ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿￿ +￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿ - ￿ ￿￿￿ 0 ￿ 1￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ / ￿ & ￿ (￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿￿ ￿ % ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
























￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ &) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿￿￿ 0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿2￿￿:=* ￿3 ￿￿￿￿5 (￿% ,&- ’￿1 &1 ( ) ￿’0 -& ’￿$ (&& -￿% ’) ) &,) 0 %
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿5 ) - ,&) &(1 ,) - ,&- &,) 0 %
￿2￿/￿￿￿:=* ￿3 ￿￿￿￿5 ’￿&$ $ ) ’￿) (,& ) ￿-0 $ , ’￿$ 1 ) % -￿0 -(0 &,(&
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 0 , % ( ,$ - ,’( ,(( &,(&
￿2￿/￿￿￿:=* ￿3 ￿< ￿￿￿! 5 $ ￿(,&- $ ￿) -’1 $ ￿$ 1 % 1 $ ￿) &-$ -￿(1 -, ,1 $ ’
=< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ) ) , $ $ 1 1 -’ 0 (0 ’,, ,1 $ ’
￿￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ &) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿￿￿ 0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
* 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>= -￿&,) - -￿() ’- -￿) -’) -￿($ % - -￿,% (& &,) 0 %
￿2*C￿ ,1 ￿(,) ( ,% ￿((0 - &-￿&) (( ,% ￿,’% $ ,￿$ % -$ &,) 0 %
￿2*￿￿=￿ ,% ￿% &1 ) &,￿&&) & &&￿) 1 1 ’ &,￿&-% ( ,￿% ) ) 0 &,) 0 %
￿2C*￿￿:= ) ￿1 % 0 & $ ￿% % % ’ 0 ￿) -% % $ ￿1 ’&) -￿1 -’$ &,) 0 %
￿2￿/￿￿=2 # 2> &(￿$ 0 ’& &’￿1 &&& &) ￿) 0 ’0 &’￿(,1 $ ,￿% $ % $ &,) 0 %
C6=J .6= ,￿() ) 0 &￿&$ ’( (￿1 () ’ (￿&0 &$ ,￿1 ,-, &,) 0 %
￿*￿=>:/A￿G -￿-,,0 -￿-% -% -￿&&% , -￿,) ,% -￿(($ ’ &,) 0 %
￿*￿=￿￿3 C# ￿￿# /25 ’,0 ,) $ 1 ) ) ’( $ ) (& ,’1 ’& &,) 0 %
￿# ￿&￿=2 # 2>￿G*:= -￿-,1 % -￿-’1 0 -￿,--( -￿-0 ’’ -￿-1 % 1 &,) 0 %
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ &) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿￿￿ 0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
* 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>= -￿,0 1 & -￿&0 (( -￿’,-, -￿(-$ - -￿,$ $ $ &,(&
￿2*C￿ ,1 ￿1 &$ , ,% ￿((0 - &-￿-(-, ,% ￿’&% ( ,￿-,% 1 &,(&
￿2*￿￿=￿ &,￿-0 -( &&￿&-0 ’ &(￿((-$ &&￿,&$ 1 ,￿$ 1 $ ( &,(&
￿2C*￿￿:= 0 ￿1 ’1 ) 1 ￿&-(% 1 ￿(1 ) ( 1 ￿,) 0 $ -￿1 $ ) ’ &,(&
￿2￿/￿ =.￿￿2 =:A:# ￿# 2> &&￿&1 1 0 &&￿% $ ,, &(￿’% ’) &&￿$ $ &% ,￿(1 -$ &,(&
C6=J .6= ,￿) &-, &￿(((- (￿$ ,-1 &￿-$ ,, ’￿,$ 0 ’ &,(&
￿*￿=>:/A￿G -￿-,$ & -￿-0 $ ’ -￿,0 1 $ -￿,(’0 -￿&% ) - &,(&
￿*￿=￿ ,&,’ ’-) , ,&,’’ ,,-1 & &,,&( &,(&
￿# ￿& =.￿￿2 =:A:# ￿=:￿G*:= -￿,,,, -￿&-% 0 -￿(0 ) & -￿&1 0 ’ -￿&) -’ &,(&
=< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ &) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿￿￿ 0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
* 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>= -￿--0 0 -￿-1 0 % -￿&’$ ( -￿,) -& -￿,$ $ 0 ,1 $ ’
￿2*C￿ ,0 ￿-1 ’, ,0 ￿0 ($ ) ,1 ￿’--- ,0 ￿0 ’1 - ,￿-1 ) ) ,1 $ ’
￿2*￿￿=￿ ,0 ￿) ,(( ,1 ￿’,0 , ,% ￿$ ,&( ,1 ￿$ (,( ,￿$ 0 ,% ,1 $ ’
￿2C6= ,1 ￿&) (1 ,% ￿-&1 ( &-￿--1 1 ,% ￿,-% ’ ,￿’’) 0 ,1 $ ’
￿2￿/￿=E￿2 =:A:# ￿# 2> ,% ￿) ,1 $ &,￿-0 -) &&￿-$ $ 0 &-￿$ ($ ’ ,￿1 $ (1 ,1 $ ’
C6=J .6= ,￿% 1 1 % (￿,’,0 ) ￿’0 ) ( &￿% $ ,) $ ￿,,’% ,1 $ ’
￿*￿=>:/A￿G -￿,-,0 -￿&’’) -￿’1 ,- -￿(() & -￿) 1 (% ,1 $ ’
￿# ￿&=E￿2 =:A:# ￿=:￿G*:= -￿-&’, -￿-$ ’$ -￿,$ ) ( -￿,’-$ -￿,% ’’ ,1 $ ’
6/￿*￿# ￿# ￿@ -￿’-$ ( -￿) &) $ -￿$ 0 ,1 -￿) $ ) ) -￿&’&$ ,1 $ ’
￿*2=￿￿*; ￿6*:# *.￿=￿￿￿￿= ￿# 2￿:=>:=￿￿# /2￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿























# . -￿-’$ 0 # . -￿0 $ ,0 # . -￿% ,) &
￿￿ -￿’% 1 & ￿￿ -￿’0 ) $ ￿￿ -￿&$ 1 1
￿  -￿&$ -) ￿  -￿’,’$ ￿  -￿-0 -1
￿= -￿,0 $ , ￿= -￿,$ 0 - ￿= -￿&) ,$
￿￿ -￿’’,( ￿￿ -￿’0 1 ’ ￿￿ -￿&(-0
￿  -￿&&) ( ￿  -￿’($ & ￿  -￿-% &(
￿= -￿,(-( ￿= -￿,,% $ ￿= -￿,,$ ’
C￿￿ -￿&0 % - C￿￿ -￿,&% ) C￿￿ -￿-,(’
C￿  -￿-&$ - C￿  -￿&’) ( C￿  -￿-’,1
C￿= -￿--1 - C￿= -￿-$ 0 ) C￿= -￿,0 ,,
C￿￿ -￿&0 ,( C￿￿ -￿,&) & C￿￿ -￿-,&(
C￿  -￿-(-) C￿  -￿&) (1 C￿  -￿-’% ’
C￿= -￿--0 ( C￿= -￿-’% 0 C￿= -￿-0 ’-
C￿￿￿# ￿￿=￿=2 =: -￿% ’% 1 *￿E￿/. -￿-(’& *￿E￿/. -￿-) ’0
￿/C./ =*￿ -￿(’’1 ￿*￿￿*.￿= -￿(,% ’ # 26>:* = -￿-$ ’%
.:#  >= -￿-,1 % ￿/C￿.#   -￿-,&0 C￿￿￿# ￿￿=.*2?=: -￿-’$ ,
:=6/￿6=: -￿’% ’, 9￿/*￿ -￿-&(% :*￿=  -￿($ $ ’
￿￿:=6/￿6=: -￿(-(% # 26>:* = -￿0 (0 1 :=9# 2 =.￿ -￿-$ ) )
￿=:C. -￿-’% 0 ￿# ￿￿=  -￿,’,0 :=￿*@.*2? -￿,% $ ’
￿=:C.￿￿. -￿-,,0 C￿2￿:/> -￿--(1 ￿G=￿9:=> -￿-’) $
￿=￿￿:= -￿’-&- C￿￿￿# ￿￿=.*2?=: -￿&&&(
￿:# C= -￿-(1 0 ￿￿￿￿*.￿= -￿&,$ 0
￿￿./:2# 2*￿= -￿---$ :=9# 2 =.￿ -￿,% % 1
.￿@/￿￿ -￿-&) , :=￿*@.*2? -￿&$ 1 1
￿*￿:=￿￿:￿￿ -￿-&’, ￿G=￿9 :=> -￿0 0 ) 1
￿￿.*￿?￿￿ -￿,1 ) 0






* -￿,$ 1 $
... -￿&1 % (
.. -￿&0 ($
. -￿&-&0
￿*2=￿￿.; ￿C=*2￿/9￿# 2 # ￿*￿/:￿￿6*:# *.￿=￿
# ￿ ￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ # ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 23 ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ =< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿

















￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿2￿￿:=* 5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿2*C￿5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿=>:/A￿G￿
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-(-% ) ) ￿￿￿-￿-,’) 0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿-￿’) &( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-(,- -￿-,’$LL -￿-(&’ -￿-,’%LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿--&% ’% ￿￿￿-￿-&$ $ ’1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,,￿￿￿￿￿-￿% ,,% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿--&% -￿-&$ $ ￿-￿--,$ -￿-&0 ’ ￿-￿-,&) -￿-,% %
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 -,-￿￿￿-￿-,$ ) ’) ￿￿￿￿￿,-￿&1 ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,0 -, -￿-,$ )LLL ￿-￿,$ % 1 -￿-,$ ( LLL ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-,0 1 % 1 ￿￿￿-￿-&’’) (￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 (￿￿￿￿￿-￿’$ ’& ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-,0 % -￿-&’) -￿-,$ ’ -￿-&’1 -￿-,&- -￿-&(’
￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&% ’$ ￿￿￿-￿-&$ &1 &￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿1 ,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 -’ ￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-&% ) -￿-&$ ( ￿-￿-&$ ) -￿-&$ - ￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿,(((&,￿￿￿-￿-&&) ,1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿% &￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿,((( -￿-&&)LLL -￿,(-( -￿-&&1LLL -￿,&) , -￿-&,$LLL
￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿----(￿￿￿-￿-,) ’$ -￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--￿￿￿￿￿-￿% % 1 ( ￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿---- -￿-,) ) -￿--’$ -￿-,) % ￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-1 -’$ 0 ￿￿￿-￿-&$ (% &￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿-) ￿￿￿￿￿-￿--&( ￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-1 -) -￿-&$ ’ LLL ￿-￿-1 $ % -￿-&0 ( LLL
￿￿C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&% ,’￿￿￿-￿-,% % (% ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿’$ ￿￿￿￿￿-￿,’(% ￿￿C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-&% , -￿-,% % ￿-￿-&) ) -￿-&,- ￿￿C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-($ % ) ￿￿￿-￿-,$ ’’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿-,￿￿￿￿￿-￿(,-$ ￿￿C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-(0 - -￿-,$ ’ LL ￿-￿-&’) -￿-(1 0
￿￿C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿,) 0 &% 0 ￿￿￿-￿-’,-1 (￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿1 (￿￿￿￿￿-￿---, ￿￿C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿,) 0 ( -￿-’,, LLL -￿&,(0 -￿-) % & LLL ￿￿C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&1 ,) ￿￿￿-￿-0 &% 0 ’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(% ￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ % % $ ￿￿C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-&1 & -￿-0 (- ￿-￿-,$ & -￿,-0 ’
￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-1 &-) ) ￿￿￿-￿-&’,$ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿((￿￿￿￿￿-￿,1 ’0 ￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-1 &, -￿-&’& LLL -￿,,-- -￿-(1 , LLL ￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿&(’&,$ ￿￿￿-￿-($ ’-$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿’(￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿&(’& -￿-($ ’ LLL -￿&) -0 -￿-$ 1 & LLL -￿&-1 & -￿-1 ’( LL
￿￿# .J ￿￿ -￿-$ ,1 -￿-) (& ￿￿# .J ￿￿ -￿-(&) -￿-% 1 -
￿￿# .J ￿  ￿-￿,’,) -￿-$ ,’ LL ￿￿# .J ￿  ￿-￿-&) 1 -￿,,&0
￿￿# .J ￿= -￿-% ,$ -￿-) 1 ) ￿￿# .J ￿= ￿-￿-,) 1 -￿,-0 &
￿￿# .J C￿￿ ￿-￿,-(% -￿-1 % & ￿￿# .J C￿￿ ￿-￿-0 ,1 -￿-% -1
￿￿# .J C￿  -￿,’-) -￿-% 1 - ￿￿# .J C￿  -￿,(,& -￿,&) $
￿￿# .J C￿= ￿-￿,% ’% -￿-% -& LL ￿￿# .J C￿= ￿-￿,1 ($ -￿,$ $ 1
￿￿# .J ￿￿ ￿-￿-(’1 -￿-$ &, ￿￿# .J ￿￿ -￿-’-1 -￿,,(1
￿￿# .J ￿  -￿-,0 1 -￿--% 1L ￿￿# .J ￿  -￿-) &) -￿,,) ’
￿￿# .J ￿= ￿-￿-$ $ & -￿-$ % $ ￿￿# .J ￿= -￿-1 $ $ -￿,&$ %
￿￿# .J C￿￿ ￿-￿-(1 0 -￿-) 1 0 ￿￿# .J C￿￿ ￿-￿-) (( -￿,-1 ,
￿￿# .J C￿  ￿-￿-’$ % -￿-0 (’ ￿￿# .J C￿  ￿-￿,) -& -￿,(’’
￿￿# .J C￿= ￿-￿-) 1 ( -￿-% 1 ) ￿￿# .J C￿= ￿-￿,&% - -￿,1 ,,
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 $ $ (￿￿￿-￿-) $ ,1 ’￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿,’￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,0 ￿￿C￿￿￿# ￿￿=￿=2 =:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,0 $ $ -￿-) $ & LLL ￿-￿,$ % ’ -￿-) ’1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-) $ ’(0 ￿￿￿-￿-&-$ 0 -￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&1 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿&--% ￿￿￿*￿=>:/A￿G￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-) $ ’ -￿-&-0LLL -￿-) 0 ’ -￿-&-0LLL -￿-) $ ) -￿-&-$LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,&,-￿￿￿-￿--&0 0 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿() ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿2￿/￿￿=2 # 2>￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-,&, -￿--&1LLL ￿-￿-,&- -￿--&0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿J ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿---% % 0 ￿￿￿-￿---,&$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿% (￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿C6=J .6=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿--,- -￿---, LLL -￿--,- -￿---, LLL -￿--,- -￿---, LLL
*; ￿2￿￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ .; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿; ￿2￿￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ =; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿




















￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-($ ,￿￿￿-￿-,$ ,) ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿’,￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿2C*￿￿:=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,-($ -￿-,$ & LLL ￿-￿,-,% -￿-,) 1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿$ &’% $ &￿￿￿-￿-(0 &-% ￿￿￿￿￿,$ ￿1 -￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿C￿￿￿# ￿￿=￿=2 =:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿$ &) - -￿-(0 & LLL -￿$ &) 0 -￿-(0 , LLL -￿$ &(1 -￿-(0 , LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿&(0 () 1 ￿￿￿-￿-(,,0 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿$ ,￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿=:C.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿&(0 ’ -￿-(,& LLL -￿&(1 ’ -￿-(-0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-,,&% -￿￿￿-￿--’’’$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿) ’￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,,, ￿￿￿2￿/￿￿=2 # 2>￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-,,( -￿--’’ LL -￿-,,, -￿--’’ LL -￿--% % -￿--’’ LL
￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿(% -1 $ % ￿￿￿-￿-(0 ,’(￿￿￿￿￿,-￿) &￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿=:C.￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿(% -% -￿-(0 , LLL -￿(% (( -￿-($ %LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿,-(((&￿￿￿-￿-,0 % ) ,￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿2C*￿￿:=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿,-(( -￿-,1 - LLL -￿,-(’ -￿-,0 %LLL -￿-% 1 % -￿-,0 %LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ -,1 ￿￿￿-￿-&1 ,&-￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿,’￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(&’ ￿￿:=6/￿6=:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-$ -& -￿-&1 , LL ￿-￿-) $ ( -￿-&0 ’ LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿) ’1 ) &-￿￿￿-￿-’’&’$ ￿￿￿￿￿,&￿’-￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿=:C.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿) ’1 ) -￿-’’& LLL -￿) ’1 $ -￿-’’& LLL -￿) ’-& -￿-’’& LLL
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿,￿$ % ’,) ￿￿￿-￿-$ % $ ((￿￿￿￿￿&’￿((￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿***￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿,￿$ % ’& -￿-$ % $LLL ￿,￿$ % ,) -￿-$ % & LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿,￿,% % -’￿￿￿-￿,1 -1 -,￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿$ (￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿***￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿,￿,% % - -￿,1 -1LLL ￿,￿,% ) , -￿,1 -)LLL ￿,￿,1 ’$ -￿,0 % %LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿,￿$ ) $ (,￿￿￿-￿-) 1 % (’￿￿￿￿￿&1 ￿,-￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿**￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿,￿$ ) $ ( -￿-) 1 %LLL ￿,￿$ ) (( -￿-) 0 %LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 1 ) ’-￿￿￿-￿,’() $ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿’0 ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿**￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿0 1 ) ’ -￿,’($LLL ￿-￿0 1 ) ) -￿,’()LLL ￿-￿0 $ % - -￿,’&1LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿,￿&&-% % ￿￿￿-￿-($ (,&￿￿￿￿￿((￿$ &￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿,￿&&,- -￿-($ ( LLL ￿,￿&,1 1 -￿-() 1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 ) &% -￿￿￿-￿,,--,,￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿1 ’￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿0 ) &% -￿,,-- LLL ￿-￿0 ) ,- -￿,-% 1LLL ￿-￿0 ’% - -￿,-% ’ LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿) % ) $ -￿￿￿-￿-&) 1 -0 ￿￿￿￿￿&(￿-1 ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿...￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿) % ) $ -￿-&) 1LLL ￿-￿) % ) % -￿-&) $LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿’,(1 -￿￿￿-￿-$ 0 ’0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿,(￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿...￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿’,(1 -￿-$ 0 )LLL ￿-￿’,(& -￿-$ 0 ’ LLL ￿-￿’,’0 -￿-$ 0 - LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿&--$ ) ￿￿￿-￿-&&$ % $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿1 ’￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿..￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿&--0 -￿-&&0LLL ￿-￿&-,- -￿-&&)LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,’’,1 ￿￿￿-￿-’$ -’,￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿,(￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,0 ￿￿..￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,’’& -￿-’$ - LLL ￿-￿,’&1 -￿-’$ - LLL ￿-￿,’$ ’ -￿-’) 1LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 -,$ ￿￿￿-￿-&’$ ) -￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿&) ￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,, ￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-1 -& -￿-&’0LLL ￿-￿-1 ,% -￿-&’( LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿&) -% 0 ￿￿￿-￿-’,) &(￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿-’￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿&) ,- -￿-’,)LLL ￿-￿&) -’ -￿-’,)LLL ￿-￿&) ’& -￿-’,( LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-&% $ (-￿￿￿-￿-,) 0 -&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ ,￿￿￿￿￿-￿) (% 0 ￿￿:*￿# 2>9/:=￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-&% $ -￿-,) 0L -￿-&% & -￿-,) )L ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,) ’,,￿￿￿-￿-&---) ￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿0 -￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿:*￿# 2>9/:=￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,) ’, -￿-&-- LLL ￿-￿,) ’0 -￿-&-- LLL ￿-￿,’($ -￿-&-- LLL
￿￿C*￿￿G ￿-￿-1 % ( -￿-&,( LLL
￿￿# .J C*￿￿G ￿-￿-(() -￿-’% %
￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿ ,’’(% ,’’(% ￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿ ,’’(% ,’’(% ,’’(%
# &￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿*￿=>:/A￿G ￿3 ,’(1 -5 &￿0 1LLL ￿3 ,’($ 1 5 &￿(( LLL ￿:# C= ￿3 ,’(1 -5 &) ￿$ ’ LLL ￿3 ,’($ 1 5 &’￿&( LLL ￿3 ,’(1 ’5 &) ￿(0LLL
C6=J .6= ￿3 ,’(1 -5 ,,￿’%LLL ￿3 ,’($ 1 5 ,-￿% ’ LLL ￿# ￿&￿=2 # 2>￿G*:= ￿3 ,’(1 -5 ￿&￿(’ LLL ￿3 ,’($ 1 5 ￿&￿’1LLL ￿3 ,’(1 ’5 ￿&￿0 )LL
F ￿￿￿￿￿! 93 &￿￿,’(0 % 5 0 ,￿’%LLL 93 &￿￿,’($ 0 5 0 ,￿(’ LLL F ￿￿￿￿￿! 93 &￿￿,’(0 % 5 &% &￿% ( LLL 93 &￿￿,’($ 0 5 &% (￿1 ’ LLL 93 &￿￿,’(1 (5 &1 0 ￿1LLL
&￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 G-; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5
F ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 ,5 -￿($ ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 ,5 -￿&) F ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 ,5 ,￿$ % ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 ,5 ,￿$ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 ,5 ,￿,0
(￿￿G￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 G-; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5
,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3 ,’(0 % 5 ￿,&￿1 ’ LLL ￿3 ,’($ 0 5 ￿,,￿0 0LLL ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3 ,’(0 % 5 ￿(￿% %LLL ￿3 ,’($ 0 5 ￿(￿’, LLL ￿3 ,’(1 (5 ￿(￿) ( LLL
*; ￿2￿￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ .; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿; ￿2￿￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ =; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿
￿.￿5 ￿ ￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ # 6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ (￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿- ￿ 7￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿$ ￿ 1￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿


















￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿M ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿2￿￿:=* 5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿2*C￿5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿
￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿=>:/A￿G￿￿￿￿￿C6=J .6=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:# C=￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿&￿=2 # 2>￿G*:=￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿>CC￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿M ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿
*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿>CC￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿1 ) -0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿((,) ￿￿￿￿￿￿,0 ￿$ ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ # 2￿=:￿=￿￿ ) ￿1 ) -1 -￿((,)LLL ) ￿1 $ -( -￿((,0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿$ 0 ,1 $ $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿1 -&0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿,&￿-) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ # 2￿=:￿=￿￿ % ￿$ 0 ,% -￿1 -&0LLL % ￿$ 0 % & -￿1 -(0LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 $ 0 (% ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&&1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿-) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&% ,$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2*C￿ -￿-0 $ 0 -￿-&&1LLL -￿-0 $ % -￿-&&1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿% &) (’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-$ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿$ $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2￿￿:=*  ￿-￿% &) ( -￿,-$ 1LLL ￿-￿% &) - -￿,-$ 0LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&(1 (,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,1 -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿(&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,1 $ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ -￿-&(1 -￿-,1 - -￿-,1 ( -￿-,1 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--) ) $ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-((’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿1 $ 0 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ -￿--) $ -￿-((’ -￿--,0 -￿-(’(
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ (% ,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&-&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿,$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,$ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿  ￿-￿-$ (% -￿-&-& LLL ￿-￿-) % , -￿-&-’ LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) % 0 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿0 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 0 ’￿￿￿￿￿  ￿  ￿-￿-) % 0 -￿-(’%L ￿-￿-) % 0 -￿-() , L
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&,&1 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿$ $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-% 0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿= ￿= -￿-&,( -￿-&’% -￿-(1 - -￿-&’1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&1 (,$ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(,$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿% $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿= ￿= -￿&1 (& -￿-(,$LLL -￿&1 &$ -￿-(,$LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--0 ) % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,$ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ ’(% ￿￿￿￿C￿￿ C￿￿ ￿-￿--0 $ -￿-,$ ’ -￿---0 -￿-,$ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-$ ) 1 ) 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&% -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿&0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&(&￿￿￿￿C￿￿ C￿￿ ￿-￿-$ ) % -￿-&% - LL ￿-￿-0 &1 -￿-(-’ LL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,-&-,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&$ -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ % ’) ￿￿￿￿C￿  C￿  -￿-,-& -￿-&$ - -￿--’( -￿-&1 ( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 -$ (￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’-1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&,) ,￿￿￿￿C￿  C￿  ￿-￿-0 -$ -￿-’-1L ￿-￿-% 1 1 -￿-’$ ( LL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 &-&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&% (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿1 (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ $ $ ￿￿￿￿C￿= C￿= ￿-￿-0 &- -￿-&% ( LL ￿-￿-,&) -￿-) ) 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&&&$ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ (’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿) ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---’￿￿￿￿C￿= C￿= ￿-￿&&&0 -￿-$ (’ LLL ￿-￿&’$ 1 -￿-% ) & LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(-(% ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ ,(% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ -￿-(-’ -￿-,0 $L -￿-,,% -￿-&,- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--) &$ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-($ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿1 1 ) 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ -￿--) ( -￿-($ 0 -￿---1 -￿-(0 0
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,$ % -$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&($ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿,0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿  ￿  ￿-￿,$ % , -￿-&($LLL ￿-￿,0 -’ -￿-&(0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,$ ,% ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(0 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ $ % ’￿￿￿￿￿  ￿  -￿-,$ & -￿-(0 % -￿-,’0 -￿-(1 (
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&1 ’&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&(&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&&-) ￿￿￿￿￿= ￿= ￿-￿-&1 ’ -￿-&(& ￿-￿-&$ % -￿-&(& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,() ,’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿) % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---(￿￿￿￿￿= ￿= -￿,() , -￿-(0 $LLL -￿,(&’ -￿-(0 %LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---&% ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&--￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿% 1 1 ) ￿￿￿￿C￿￿ C￿￿ ￿-￿---( -￿-&-- -￿--($ -￿-&-0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-1 ,) &0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(() ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿’’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,’% ￿￿￿￿C￿￿ C￿￿ ￿-￿-1 ,) -￿-(()LL ￿-￿-1 1 - -￿-() , LL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&% ’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&,$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿($ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 &0 ￿￿￿￿C￿  C￿  ￿-￿-&% ’ -￿-&,$ ￿-￿-&) 1 -￿-&(& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ 1 ,,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(’&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿,,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&$ ) ’￿￿￿￿C￿  C￿  ￿-￿-$ 1 , -￿-(’& LL ￿-￿-$ $ & -￿-($ )L
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,) % -&0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’&,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---&￿￿￿￿C￿= C￿= -￿,) % - -￿-’&, LLL -￿&,% 1 -￿-$ -$LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 ) $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 ) $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 $ ’1 ￿￿￿￿C￿= C￿= ￿-￿-0 ) $ -￿-1 ) $ -￿-0 () -￿-0 % ,
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 &,-&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&) 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&,&0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ # . -￿-1 &, -￿-&) 1LLL -￿,(-, -￿-’) ( LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&() ,(1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(% -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿-&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿# . # . -￿&() , -￿-(% - LLL -￿&) (, -￿-0 0 ( LLL
# .J ￿￿ -￿-) % , -￿-) % $ # .J ￿￿ -￿-((’ -￿-% 1 -
# .J ￿  ￿-￿-1 $ 1 -￿-$ &$ # .J ￿  ￿-￿-&&( -￿-% ) )
# .J ￿= -￿-% ,% -￿-1 ,’ # .J ￿= ￿-￿--1 0 -￿-% 0 ,
# .J C￿￿ ￿-￿-1 ,1 -￿-) ) 1 # .J C￿￿ ￿-￿-0 ’’ -￿-1 ((
# .J C￿  -￿-0 0 ’ -￿-0 -& # .J C￿  -￿,&0 , -￿,-&&
# .J C￿= ￿-￿&--’ -￿,-,- LL # .J C￿= ￿-￿,% ) - -￿,’% -
# .J ￿￿ ￿-￿-() , -￿-$ 1 1 # .J ￿￿ -￿-(% , -￿,,((
# .J ￿  -￿,,1 0 -￿-$ % $L # .J ￿  -￿,0 $ - -￿,-’& L
# .J ￿= ￿-￿-$ (% -￿-$ ) ( # .J ￿= -￿-1 ,% -￿,,&$
# .J C￿￿ ￿-￿-(1 % -￿-$ 0 - # .J C￿￿ ￿-￿-) ,1 -￿,-) 1
# .J C￿  ￿-￿-’0 % -￿-1 ’( # .J C￿  ￿-￿,’) ( -￿,,$ ’
# .J C￿= ￿-￿-$ $ & -￿-% &) # .J C￿= ￿-￿,&$ % -￿,% ) 1
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 &% $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) 1 (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿% 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--(-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿# ￿￿=￿=2 =: ￿-￿,0 (- -￿-) 1 ( LLL ￿-￿,0 &0 -￿-) 1 ( LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) ((0 &￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(-$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’’) ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿=>:/A￿G -￿-) (’ -￿-(-$L -￿-) ’( -￿-(-0L
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,,$ (￿￿￿￿￿-￿--((-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿) (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2￿/￿￿=2 # 2> ￿-￿-,,$ -￿--(( LLL ￿-￿-,,0 -￿--(( LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---% % % ￿￿￿￿-￿---,-% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿,0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿J ￿￿￿ C6=J .6= -￿--,- -￿---, LLL -￿--,- -￿---, LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-&&$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&-$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿% 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2C*￿￿:= ￿-￿,-&( -￿-&-$LLL ￿-￿,-&( -￿-&-)LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ &($ ) % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) -0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿,&￿&% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿# ￿￿=￿=2 =: -￿$ &(0 -￿-) -0LLL -￿$ &’& -￿-) -0LLL
*; ￿2￿￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ .; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿; ￿2￿￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿" "
8￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 9 ￿ -￿ :￿ ￿/￿-￿ ￿￿ ￿ :￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ (￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿￿-￿ 7￿￿￿￿￿ ￿$ ￿ 1￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿

















￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&’-(0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(&(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿’’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿=:C. -￿&’-’ -￿-(&( LLL -￿&(1 ) -￿-(&’ LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,,-’￿￿￿￿￿-￿--) $ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿% ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) ,$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2￿/￿￿=2 # 2> -￿-,,- -￿--) 0L -￿-,-% -￿--) 0L
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(% ,-’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’&(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿&’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿=:C.￿￿. -￿(% ,- -￿-’&( LLL -￿(% (1 -￿-’&- LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-,) ((￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿$ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2C*￿￿:= -￿,-,) -￿-&0 )LLL -￿,-,) -￿-&0 )LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿((￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ 0 -(￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(-&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿1 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) % ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ :=6/￿6=: ￿-￿-$ 0 - -￿-(-& LL ￿-￿-) $ ) -￿-(-& L ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) ) -’1 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ -(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿,(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿=:C. -￿) ) -) -￿-$ -( LLL -￿) ) -) -￿-$ -& LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&() -1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’,1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿$ (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿:=6/￿6=: ￿-￿&() , -￿-’,1LLL ￿-￿&(’$ -￿-’,$LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(($ 1 -,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-&(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿&% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿=:C.￿￿. -￿(($ 1 -￿,-&( LLL -￿((% & -￿,-&’ LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿() ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ ’% ) ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 ’1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’’(1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ .:#  >= -￿-$ ) - -￿-1 ’1 -￿-$ &) -￿-1 ’$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿((￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(((% ’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&% &￿￿￿￿￿￿,,￿’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ :=6/￿6=: -￿(((% -￿-&% & LLL -￿((’- -￿-&% , LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿($ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&’$ &-$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-((1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿&% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿/C./ =*￿ -￿&’$ & -￿-((1LLL -￿&’) ) -￿-((1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&&() ) (￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) ) $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿-&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿:=6/￿6=: -￿&&($ -￿-) ) $LLL -￿&&(& -￿-) ) )LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿() ) -’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,1 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿,1 ￿% 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿=￿￿:= -￿() ) - -￿-,1 0LLL -￿() ) , -￿-,1 0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿() ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿1 $ 1 % % 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-% $ (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿-(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ .:#  >= -￿1 $ % - -￿-% $ ( LLL -￿1 $ ) % -￿-% $ ’ LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(0 ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 ) ,’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&-% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿$ -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿=:9￿:￿ ￿-￿-0 ) , -￿-&-%LLL ￿-￿-0 ’% -￿-&-%LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿($ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&-’’&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(1 (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿(’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿/C./ =*￿ ￿-￿&-’’ -￿-(1 ( LLL ￿-￿&-) - -￿-(1 & LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’% % ’% ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(% $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿,&￿$ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿:# C= -￿’% % ) -￿-(% $LLL -￿) --( -￿-(% 0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&,1 ,1 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’1 (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿) ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿=￿￿:= -￿&,1 & -￿-’1 ( LLL -￿&,1 & -￿-’1 ( LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 1 (&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(% (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿(&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,1 $ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿# ￿&￿=2 # 2>￿G*:= ￿-￿-0 1 ( -￿-(% ( LL ￿-￿-0 % - -￿-(% & LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(0 ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-(&,(1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿% 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿=:9￿:￿ ￿-￿-(&, -￿-&’0 ￿-￿-(&( -￿-&’0
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’$ (&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’1 (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿% $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿((0 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*?=/6=: ￿-￿-’$ ( -￿-’1 ( ￿-￿-’$ ’ -￿-’1 ( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) $ 0 1 -0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(% ,￿￿￿￿￿￿,’￿) &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*?=/6=: -￿) $ 0 1 -￿-(% , LLL -￿) $ 1 ’ -￿-(% , LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&,% ,(￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ &’(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿:=￿￿:￿￿ -￿-&,% -￿-’’0 -￿-&,’ -￿-’’$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(&$ (0 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 ((￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿:=￿￿:￿￿ -￿(&$ ’ -￿-0 (( LLL -￿(&$ & -￿-0 (’ LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&) -&0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&1 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿1 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿.*￿?￿￿ ￿-￿&) -( -￿-&1 , LLL ￿-￿&) -1 -￿-&1 , LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--0 ,&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’) ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿1 0 ) ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿.*￿?￿￿ ￿-￿--0 , -￿-’) ’ ￿-￿--$ ’ -￿-’) ’
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) (-1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&(&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿&% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&&-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!  =.￿:=￿*@ ￿-￿-) (, -￿-&(& LL ￿-￿-) &0 -￿-&(, LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 --,$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(&(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿&$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!  =.￿:=￿*@ -￿,0 -- -￿-(&( LLL -￿,0 -& -￿-(&( LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,) 0 % -,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿) &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---’￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿ .￿@/￿￿ -￿,) 0 % -￿-’’%LLL -￿,) ) & -￿-’’0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(0 ’% ,’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 % $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿,1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿ .￿@/￿￿ -￿(0 ’% -￿-1 % $LLL -￿(0 ’1 -￿-1 % $LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--$ ) % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&-$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 ’% &￿￿￿￿A￿￿+ ￿￿￿ A/:?￿*￿ ￿-￿--$ $ -￿-&-$ ￿-￿--0 , -￿-&-$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---&&0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(0 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿% % ) &￿￿￿￿A￿￿+ ￿￿￿ A/:?￿*￿ -￿---& -￿-(0 0 ￿-￿---’ -￿-(0 0
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ ) ,1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&-’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿$ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-$ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2*￿￿=￿ ￿-￿-$ ) & -￿-&-’ LLL ￿-￿-$ ) $ -￿-&-’ LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) ,% ,(,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,’’￿￿￿￿￿￿() ￿% ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2*￿￿=￿ -￿) ,% , -￿-,’’ LLL -￿) ,1 1 -￿-,’)LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿() % 0 0 &￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-% 1 (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿$ $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---(￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ * 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>= -￿() % 1 -￿-% 1 ( LLL -￿() $ ( -￿-% 1 )LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿0 () % $ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-% ’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿,1 ￿(0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ * 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>= ,￿0 ($ - -￿-% ’)LLL ,￿0 () 1 -￿-% ’( LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿$ % &(0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 ,(￿￿￿￿￿￿&-￿1 (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ *** ￿,￿$ % &’ -￿-1 ,( LLL ￿,￿$ % &0 -￿-1 ,( LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&-&(￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&(1 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿-’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ *** ￿,￿&-&( -￿&(1 1LLL ￿,￿,% 1 & -￿&(1 0LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿$ ) ) (0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ 0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿&’￿’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿ ** ￿,￿$ ) ) ’ -￿-$ 0 $LLL ￿,￿$ ) 1 % -￿-$ 0 0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 1 1 (% ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&-) 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿1 (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿ ** ￿-￿0 1 1 ’ -￿&-) 0LLL ￿-￿0 1 1 ) -￿&-) %LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&,0 1 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’% % ￿￿￿￿￿￿&’￿’,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿ * ￿,￿&,0 % -￿-’% %LLL ￿,￿&,1 0 -￿-’% %LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 ) &0 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,) $ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿1 -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿ * ￿-￿0 ) &1 -￿,) $ %LLL ￿-￿0 ) -1 -￿,) $ %LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) % &$ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-() ’￿￿￿￿￿￿,$ ￿0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ... ￿-￿) % &0 -￿-() ’ LLL ￿-￿) % ’, -￿-() ’ LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’,) -&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-% 1 -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿&’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ... ￿-￿’,) - -￿-% 1 - LLL ￿-￿’,’’ -￿-% 1 , LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,% % -1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&1 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿1 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿ .. ￿-￿,% % , -￿-&1 %LLL ￿-￿,% % 0 -￿-&1 %LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,’0 $ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ 0 &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿&-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&1 &￿￿￿￿￿￿ .. ￿-￿,’0 $ -￿-$ 0 & LL ￿-￿,’$ ) -￿-$ 0 ’ LL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 % (0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&% ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿0 &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--$ ) ￿￿￿￿￿ . ￿-￿-0 % ’ -￿-&% , LLL ￿-￿-0 % $ -￿-&% , LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&) () 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) % % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿&(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿ . ￿-￿&) ($ -￿-) % %LLL ￿-￿&) (& -￿-$ -- LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) (￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&0 (&&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&) 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 0 ) ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ :*￿# 2>9/:=￿*￿￿ -￿-&0 ( -￿-&) 0 -￿-&1 & -￿-&) 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) (￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,) ’&’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(,-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿% 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ :*￿# 2>9/:=￿*￿￿ ￿-￿,) ’& -￿-(,- LLL ￿-￿,) ’1 -￿-(,- LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(’% () 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(-0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿,,￿(1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿! ￿-& 2 ,’’(% ,’’(% 2 ,’’(% ,’’(%
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) (￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,) ’&’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(,-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿% 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ >CC￿/￿F ￿9￿ (--’$ &% $ ) & >CC￿/￿F ￿9￿ (--’$ &% $ ) &
# &￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
,￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 G-; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿>CC￿/￿F ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9￿￿￿￿￿￿￿D 2
F ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 &5 &￿-1 -% &￿-) ($ ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 &5 &￿-1 -% &￿-) ($
*; ￿2￿￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ .; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿; ￿2￿￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" " ￿ ￿ % ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿  
8￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 9 ￿ - ￿ :￿ ￿/￿- ￿ ￿￿ ￿ :￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿ -￿ 7￿￿￿￿￿ ￿$ ￿ 1￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿

















￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿=>:/A￿G￿
￿￿￿￿C6=J .6=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:# C=￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿&￿=2 # 2>￿G*:=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿F ￿￿￿￿￿! 5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿G￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ,% 0 1 5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿G￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿
￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿
￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿$ ￿-(1 &’% ￿￿￿-￿$ $ ) (&0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿-1 ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿# 2￿=:￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿-(1 & -￿$ $ ) ( LLL $ ￿-’,) -￿$ $ &%LLL ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿1 ￿-$ &1 (’￿￿￿-￿0 (0 ’,&￿￿￿￿￿,-￿% (￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿# 2￿=:￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿-$ &1 -￿0 (0 ’ LLL 1 ￿-) ,( -￿0 (1 $LLL 1 ￿-’$ 0 -￿0 ($ 0LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-% 1 1 % % ￿￿￿-￿-’,(0 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 -￿￿￿￿￿-￿’1 ’& ￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-% 1 % -￿-’,’ LL -￿-% % % -￿-’% )LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿) (1 1 ,￿￿￿-￿-% 0 ) $ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿) &￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿) (1 1 -￿-% 0 $LLL ￿-￿) (0 , -￿-% 0 $LLL ￿-￿) &% - -￿-% 0 ’ LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-,) ) () ￿￿￿-￿-&-$ 0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿-￿’) &) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-,) ) -￿-&-0 -￿-,,& -￿-&,( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿--) 0 (-￿￿￿-￿-(’&$ (￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿1 $ 0 & ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿--) 0 -￿-(’( ￿-￿---$ -￿-() & ￿-￿-&% % -￿-&0 %
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) 0 (0 ￿￿￿-￿-&-,$ -￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿1 ) ￿￿￿￿￿-￿--’’ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-) 0 ’ -￿-&-& LLL ￿-￿-) &1 -￿-&-)LL ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’,(% ￿￿￿-￿-&($ ’,￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&(￿￿￿￿￿-￿&,1 $ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-’,’ -￿-&($L ￿-￿-’1 % -￿-&’- LL ￿-￿-) ,% -￿-(&-
￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿---’% ) ￿￿￿-￿-&0 1 -&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&￿￿￿￿￿-￿% 1 ) 1 ￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿---) -￿-&0 1 -￿--&0 -￿-&0 $ ￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿,) -% &1 ￿￿￿-￿-&% ) &% ￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿,,￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿,) -% -￿-&% )LLL -￿,’1 % -￿-&% 1LLL -￿,(% ) -￿-&1 0LLL
￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿--1 1 1 ) ￿￿￿-￿-&($ $ &￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(1 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 -0 ( ￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿--1 % -￿-&(0 -￿-,,, -￿-&’1 ￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-0 % ) ((￿￿￿-￿-() -1 ’￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿&0 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&(’ ￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-0 % ) -￿-() , LL ￿-￿-1 % $ -￿-($ , LL
￿￿C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-,) 1 &(￿￿￿-￿-’’,’&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿($ ￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 &-- ￿￿C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-,) 1 -￿-’’, -￿-,) , -￿-’% & ￿￿C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) ’’1 ￿￿￿-￿-(&-1 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ &￿￿￿￿￿-￿) (0 & ￿￿C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-) ’) -￿-(&, L ￿-￿-0 1 - -￿-(% ( LL
￿￿C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-’0 -% -￿￿￿-￿-&) (&&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&$ ￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 % ($ ￿￿C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-’0 , -￿-&) ( L ￿-￿-&$ 0 -￿-’$ 0 ￿￿C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 &’1 ￿￿￿-￿-’$ -0 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿’($ % ￿￿C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-1 &) -￿-’$ , L ￿-￿-0 ) 0 -￿-’-- L
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(&1 0 ￿￿￿-￿-,&0 0 &￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿’’￿￿￿￿￿-￿,’% - ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-(&% -￿-,&1LL -￿-&0 0 -￿-,(( LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿--￿-(’(0 ￿￿￿-￿-(0 $ (&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿% ,￿￿￿￿￿-￿($ ,, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-(’’ -￿-(0 $ -￿-(,% -￿-(1 ’ -￿-(&1 -￿-&0 ’
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿&$ ,(% ,￿￿￿-￿-$ ,1 1 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿&&￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿/C./ =*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿&$ ,’ -￿-$ ,%LLL -￿&) % , -￿-$ ,)LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿&,) ) (% ￿￿￿-￿-&) 1 $ $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿((￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿2C*￿￿:=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿&,) ) -￿-&) %LLL -￿&,$ ) -￿-&) %LLL -￿&,&% -￿-&) 1LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿(0 $ 1 % -￿￿￿-￿-&--% ) ￿￿￿￿￿,1 ￿0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿=￿￿:=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿(0 $ % -￿-&-, LLL -￿(0 0 1 -￿-&-& LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-(&% ,,￿￿￿-￿-’&1 ,) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 0 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿’’&, ￿￿￿￿:=6/￿6=:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-(&% -￿-’&1 -￿-(’0 -￿-’&1 -￿-&% ’ -￿-’&0
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,&(1 1 ￿￿￿-￿-((1 $ (￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿$ $ ￿￿￿￿￿-￿---( ￿￿￿=:9￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,&(% -￿-((%LLL ￿-￿,&(% -￿-((1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿(-% 0 % ￿￿￿-￿-(&(-(￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿) % ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿/C./ =*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿(-% 1 -￿-(&( LLL ￿-￿(,-( -￿-(&& LLL ￿-￿(,) & -￿-(&( LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿’$ % (’1 ￿￿￿-￿-’(&(% ￿￿￿￿￿,-￿1 ) ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿:# C=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿’$ % ( -￿-’(& LLL -￿’$ % $ -￿-’(, LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-% ,1 $ (￿￿￿-￿-’’,$ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿-1 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(0 $ ￿￿￿=￿￿:=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-% ,% -￿-’’& LL -￿-% -0 -￿-’’& LL -￿-1 % $ -￿-’’, LL
￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ $ % 0 ￿￿￿-￿-(($ 1 ’￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&) ￿￿￿￿￿-￿&,&( ￿￿￿# ￿&￿=2 # 2>￿G*:=￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-$ 0 - -￿-((0LL ￿-￿-$ 0 , -￿-((0LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-(’,% ,￿￿￿-￿-&’0 -&￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿$ ) ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿=:9￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-(’& -￿-&’0 -￿-(’0 -￿-&’0 -￿-(,& -￿-&’$
￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿--,0 % $ ￿￿￿-￿-) -&,(￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’￿￿￿￿￿-￿% 0 ,) ￿￿￿*?=/6=:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿--,1 -￿-) -& -￿--,$ -￿-) -, ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿(’&0 -% ￿￿￿-￿-(&,1 % ￿￿￿￿￿,-￿$ ) ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿*?=/6=:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿(’&0 -￿-(&& LLL -￿(’&) -￿-(&& LLL -￿(’) ) -￿-(&, LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-) ,) $ 0 ￿￿￿-￿-’1 ,&&￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿-0 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿&1 (% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿*￿:=￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-) ,$ -￿-’1 , -￿-) ,$ -￿-’1 ’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿&’1 (1 0 ￿￿￿-￿-$ ($ ) $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿% -￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿*￿:=￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿&’1 ’ -￿-$ (0LLL -￿&) ,( -￿-$ (0LLL -￿&) ,) -￿-$ (’ LLL
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) --% ￿￿￿-￿-&) ’’’￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿% 0 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’% ,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿ =.￿:=￿*@￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-) -, -￿-&) ’ LL ￿-￿-) -, -￿-&) ’ LL ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿,&(% 0 0 ￿￿￿-￿-&) % 0 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿0 0 ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿ =.￿:=￿*@￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿,&’- -￿-&$ - LLL -￿,&(0 -￿-&$ - LLL -￿,(,$ -￿-&$ - LLL
￿￿.￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿&-’1 ) $ ￿￿￿-￿-) ’) ,&￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿-￿---&￿￿￿.￿! ￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿@/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿&-’% -￿-) ’)LLL -￿&--$ -￿-) ’- LLL ￿￿.￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,,&,,￿￿￿-￿-0 ) $ % ’￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿’1 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿,(1 $ ￿￿￿.￿! ￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿@/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,,&, -￿-0 ) 0 ￿-￿,-0 ( -￿-0 ) 1 ￿-￿-% ’) -￿-0 ) ’
￿￿A￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,’) 1 ￿￿￿-￿-&,($ -￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿’% ) -￿￿￿A￿￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿￿A/:?￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-,’$ -￿-&,’ ￿-￿-,’) -￿-&,) ￿￿A￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ % 1 0 ￿￿￿-￿-(&) ,&￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿,) ￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(,0 ￿￿￿A￿￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿￿A/:?￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-$ % % -￿-(&)LL ￿-￿-0 ,( -￿-(&)LL ￿-￿-$ -$ -￿-(&’ L
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 ) $ &￿￿￿-￿-((% ) % ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿-1 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿&0 % 1 ￿￿￿2*￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-0 ) $ -￿-(’- LL ￿-￿-0 $ ) -￿-(-0LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿’0 1 % ’,￿￿￿-￿-,--,’￿￿￿￿￿’0 ￿1 (￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿￿2*￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿’0 1 % -￿-,-- LLL -￿’0 1 $ -￿-,-- LLL -￿’0 1 ’ -￿-,-- LLL
￿￿￿￿F ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿(&% 0 (&￿￿￿-￿,% ,% 1 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿0 &￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 ) % ￿￿* 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿(&% 0 -￿,% &- L -￿(&) 1 -￿,% &)L ￿￿￿￿F ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿,￿$ ,’% ) &￿￿￿-￿-0 $ &0 &￿￿￿￿￿&,￿,0 ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿* 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ,￿$ ,) - -￿-0 $ ( LLL ,￿$ &,- -￿-0 $ ( LLL ,￿$ -% $ -￿-0 $ , LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿,￿) ’% $ % ￿￿￿-￿,(1 1 % ) ￿￿￿￿￿,,￿,$ ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿***￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿,￿) ’% 0 -￿,(1 %LLL ￿,￿) ) -’ -￿,(% $LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ -(,(￿￿￿-￿&0 ’-0 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿&-￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&0 1 ￿￿***￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿$ -(, -￿&0 ’, LL ￿-￿) 1 ,& -￿&0 ’, LL ￿-￿) 1 $ % -￿&0 &0LL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿,￿) $ $ % &￿￿￿-￿,-) ’’1 ￿￿￿￿￿,’￿1 $ ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿**￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿,￿) $ $ % -￿,-) ’ LLL ￿,￿) $ $ & -￿,-) 1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,1 &--￿￿￿-￿,1 &) ’,￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿--￿￿￿￿￿-￿(,1 1 ￿￿**￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,1 &- -￿,1 &) ￿-￿,0 ’& -￿,1 &) ￿-￿,$ (’ -￿,1 ,&
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿,￿,&(’-￿￿￿-￿-’$ (1 1 ￿￿￿￿￿&’￿&&￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿,￿,&(’ -￿-’$ ’ LLL ￿,￿,&’, -￿-’$ %LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿’(1 ,,￿￿￿-￿,(($ $ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿&1 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,, ￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿’(1 , -￿,((0LLL ￿-￿’&1 , -￿,((0LLL ￿-￿’&$ $ -￿,(&1LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿) $ $ -1 ￿￿￿-￿-(0 0 0 % ￿￿￿￿￿,’￿% 1 ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿...￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿) $ $ , -￿-(0 1LLL ￿-￿) $ $ $ -￿-(1 , LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,1 $ -% ￿￿￿-￿-1 () 0 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿&(￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&$ - ￿￿...￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,1 $ , -￿-1 ($LL ￿-￿,1 -’ -￿-1 ($LL ￿-￿,1 ’, -￿-1 (& LL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,$ ,,0 ￿￿￿-￿-(&$ -) ￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿% ’￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿..￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,$ ,& -￿-(&$LLL ￿-￿,$ ,) -￿-(&%LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&-’(￿￿￿-￿-) $ (0 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿($ ￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 ,0 , ￿￿..￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-&-’ -￿-) $ ’ ￿-￿-,’- -￿-) $ ’ ￿-￿-,1 ) -￿-) $ &
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(,% % ￿￿￿-￿-’,’,$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 0 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿’(% % ￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-(&- -￿-’,’ ￿-￿-(,% -￿-’,, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿&(-0 % ￿￿￿-￿-) -0 ,1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿) ) ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿&(-1 -￿-) -0LLL ￿-￿&&0 ’ -￿-) -0LLL ￿-￿&&% 1 -￿-) -$LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿--’1 (,￿￿￿-￿-&0 -$ -￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,1 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿1 ) 1 ( ￿￿:*￿# 2>9/:=￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿--’1 -￿-&0 , -￿--) $ -￿-&0 ( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,$ -’$ ￿￿￿-￿-&) 0 $ -￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿&(￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿￿:*￿# 2>9/:=￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,$ -) -￿-&) 1LLL ￿-￿,$ &’ -￿-&) 1LLL ￿-￿,) $ - -￿-&) 0LLL
￿￿C*￿￿G ￿-￿-% $ , -￿-(($LLL
￿￿# .J C*￿￿G -￿-) -( -￿,(-,
2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿ $ $ (( $ $ (( 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿ $ $ (( $ $ (( $ $ ((
# &￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿*￿=>:/A￿G ￿3 $ ) 0 % 5 &￿% )LLL ￿3 $ ) $ 0 5 &￿% 1LLL ￿:# C= ￿3 $ ) 0 % 5 ,0 ￿0 ( LLL ￿3 $ ) $ 0 5 ,0 ￿0 ( LLL ￿3 $ ) 1 (5 ,0 ￿0 ( LLL
C6=J .6= ￿3 $ ) 0 % 5 (￿$ )LLL ￿3 $ ) $ 0 5 (￿$ )LLL ￿# ￿&￿=2 # 2>￿G*:= ￿3 $ ) 0 % 5 ￿&￿&- LLL ￿3 $ ) $ 0 5 ￿&￿&- LLL ￿3 $ ) 1 (5 ￿&￿,& LLL
F ￿￿￿￿￿! 93 &￿￿$ ) 0 1 5 1 ￿% - LLL 93 &￿￿$ ) $ $ 5 1 ￿% 0LLL F ￿￿￿￿￿! 93 &￿￿$ ) 0 1 5 ,) 0 ￿1 ( LLL 93 &￿￿$ ) $ $ 5 ,) 0 ￿0 ’ LLL 93 &￿￿$ ) 1 &5 ,) 0 ￿) %LLL
&￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 G-; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5
F ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 ,5 -￿,) ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 ,5 -￿,’ F ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 ,5 ,￿(& ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 ,5 ,￿() ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 ,5 ,￿-%
(￿￿G￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 G-; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5
,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3 $ ) 0 1 5 ￿,(￿$ 0LLL ￿3 $ ) $ $ 5 ￿,&￿% ( LLL ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3 $ ) 0 1 5 ￿(￿&( LLL ￿3 $ ) $ $ 5 ￿(￿’& LLL ￿3 $ ) 1 &5 ￿(￿$ %LLL
￿.￿5 ￿ ￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ # 6￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ (￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿- ￿ 7￿￿￿￿￿ ￿$ ￿ 1￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ 1￿ ; ￿￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ )￿ ￿$
￿2￿￿:=* ￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2*C￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
 ; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" " " ￿ ￿ % ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿  

















￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿M ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿2￿￿:=* 5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿2*C￿5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿,% % 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,% % 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿M ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿=>:/A￿G￿￿￿￿￿C6=J .6=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:# C=￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿&￿=2 # 2>￿G*:=
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿:=* ￿￿￿￿￿2*C￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿>CC￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿M ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿F ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿>CC￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿
￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿(￿0 &($ ,0 ￿￿￿&￿-1 ) 1 % % ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿0 % ￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 ’(￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ # 2￿=:￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (￿0 &($ &￿-1 ) %L ) ￿’’$ 1 -￿(&(, LLL ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿’￿1 $ $ $ ’0 ￿￿￿-￿% $ -1 0 ’￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿-$ ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿1 $ $ $ -￿% $ -%LLL ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿) ￿0 (&&,(￿￿￿-￿$ $ % -1 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿) 0 ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ) ￿0 (&& -￿$ $ % , LLL ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿) ￿1 &’(,(￿￿￿&￿(0 &(,% ￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿’$ ￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,’&￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ) ￿1 &’( &￿(0 &( LL ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿$ ￿$ ’1 ) () ￿￿￿-￿(% $ ) 0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿,$ ￿0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿$ ’1 ) -￿(% $ $LLL ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿,) ￿0 % $ $ -￿￿￿’￿% $ 0 0 (1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿,1 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,) ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ,) ￿0 % $ $ ’￿% $ 0 0LLL
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&,,&￿￿￿-￿--1 ’$ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿’% ￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,&0 ￿2￿/￿￿=2 # 2>￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-&,, -￿--1 )LL ￿-￿-,&0 -￿--($LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,$ 1 (￿￿￿-￿--’0 () ￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿) $ ￿￿￿￿￿-￿---’ ￿-￿-,$ 1 -￿--’0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(0 &,￿￿￿-￿--% 0 0 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿1 ,￿￿￿￿￿-￿---, ￿-￿-(0 & -￿--% 1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(--% ￿￿￿-￿-,,) ) ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿1 0 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿(1 &0 ￿-￿-(-, -￿-,,$LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿--0 1 ,￿￿￿-￿--$ -) 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&% ￿￿￿￿￿-￿,% 0 $ ￿-￿--0 1 -￿--$ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,-&￿￿￿-￿-,’0 % $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿% ’) , ￿-￿--,- -￿-,’1
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,$ 1 &&￿￿￿-￿-0 % ) (&￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿,&￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(’) ￿2C*￿￿:=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,$ 1 & -￿-0 % )LL ￿-￿,,&, -￿-,0 0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,(1 1 &￿￿￿-￿-’1 ) &-￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿1 $ ￿￿￿￿￿-￿--’( ￿-￿,(1 1 -￿-’1 )LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,’1 --￿￿￿-￿-’&(% 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿’% ￿￿￿￿￿-￿---) ￿-￿,’1 - -￿-’&’ LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 $ $ 0 ￿￿￿-￿-1 -&% 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿&-￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&0 % ￿-￿,0 $ 0 -￿-1 -( LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 ,,0 ￿￿￿-￿-&,-1 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) (￿￿￿￿￿-￿) % $ ( ￿-￿-1 ,& -￿-&,, LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-0 ’% ￿￿￿-￿-’0 0 ’,￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿&) ￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&’’ ￿-￿,-0 ) -￿-’0 0LL
) --CK￿￿￿￿￿K￿,. ,.K￿￿￿￿￿K,-. ￿￿￿￿￿B,-. ￿￿￿￿,% % 1 ￿￿￿￿￿,% % 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿&) -C &) -CK￿￿￿￿￿K￿) --C
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ " <
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿($ ,$ % 0 ￿￿￿-￿-% ) &-) ￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿1 -￿￿￿￿￿-￿---, ￿=:C.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿($ ,0 -￿-% ) & LLL -￿,1 ) % -￿-((%LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿,$ 1 1 &’￿￿￿-￿-0 ((0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿(-￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&,) -￿,$ 1 1 -￿-0 (’ LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿&,&,$ ’￿￿￿-￿-$ 0 $ ,) ￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿,’￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,0 -￿&,&& -￿-$ 0 $LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-0 ) ’,&￿￿￿-￿&,’) ,&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿() ￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 &) & -￿-0 ) ’ -￿&,’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿&0 $ 1 ) $ ￿￿￿-￿-(1 &&&￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿&’￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, -￿&0 $ % -￿-(1 & LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿’,-1 1 1 ￿￿￿-￿&,) ,(% ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿% ,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) $ & -￿’,-% -￿&,) , L
￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿’) 0 0 0 $ ￿￿￿-￿,’) ) (% ￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿,) ￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,0 ￿=:C.￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿’) 0 1 -￿,’) )LLL -￿(’1 0 -￿-’,& LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿,’&(,&￿￿￿-￿-% 1 $ 0 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿’’￿￿￿￿￿-￿,’% ’ -￿,’&( -￿-% 1 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿(’’) ,&￿￿￿-￿,,0 ) 1 ’￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿% (￿￿￿￿￿-￿--(’ -￿(’’) -￿,,0 $LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿(,,(-) ￿￿￿-￿-1 1 &% 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿) (￿￿￿￿￿-￿---’ -￿(,,( -￿-1 1 ( LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿&1 -’-’￿￿￿-￿-$ &--,￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿) &￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, -￿&1 -’ -￿-$ &- LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿,% &’% ,￿￿￿-￿-0 &1 &&￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿$ &￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-’) -￿,% &) -￿-0 &1LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿&’-) 1 ￿￿￿-￿,0 1 $ ’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿() ￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 1 & :=6/￿6=:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿&’-$ -￿,0 1 $ ￿-￿-1 $ ( -￿-&% ’ LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,&$ -) ￿￿￿-￿-% ’% ’1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿((￿￿￿￿￿-￿,1 ’’ ￿-￿,&$ , -￿-% ’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-$ 0 &￿￿￿-￿-) &’&(￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿-’￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’&- ￿-￿,-$ 0 -￿-) &’ LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 &&(￿￿￿-￿,0 ,,,1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿-,￿￿￿￿￿-￿(,’( ￿-￿,0 && -￿,0 ,, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿-’&,((￿￿￿-￿-(-$ 0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿(0 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿,$ % $ -￿-’&, -￿-(-0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿’1 0 &% % ￿￿￿-￿(’% &1 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿’-￿￿￿￿￿-￿,$ (, -￿’1 0 ( -￿(’% (
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿&0 $ (&￿￿￿-￿,&&) 0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿&) ￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&’& ￿￿:=6/￿6=:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿&0 $ ( -￿,&&$LL ￿-￿(-1 0 -￿-’-1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,--1 ) ￿￿￿-￿-’$ &) 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿,1 ￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&% ( ￿-￿,--% -￿-’$ ( LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,$ (((￿￿￿-￿-$ &(1 ’￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿$ &￿￿￿￿￿-￿--1 % ￿-￿,$ (( -￿-$ &’ LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿(0 ) 1 0 ￿￿￿-￿,-0 ,$ (￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿) ,￿￿￿￿￿-￿---) ￿-￿(0 ) % -￿,-0 & LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,,% &-￿￿￿-￿-(1 % % (￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿-$ ￿￿￿￿￿-￿--&& ￿-￿,,% & -￿-(% - LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿(% -0 ) ’￿￿￿-￿(’$ -&) ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿,(￿￿￿￿￿-￿&) 1 % -￿(% -1 -￿(’$ -
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 % ,-￿￿￿-￿&0 ’,(’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ ) ￿￿￿￿￿-￿) ,($ .:#  >=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,0 % , -￿&0 ’, ￿-￿-$ -( -￿-0 ’& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,% ,) ,￿￿￿-￿,% () ,% ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿% % ￿￿￿￿￿-￿(&&’ ￿-￿,% ,) -￿,% () ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿,1 % % (’￿￿￿-￿,) (% $ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&(￿￿￿￿￿-￿&,0 $ -￿,1 % % -￿,) ’- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,1 1 ,&￿￿￿-￿&0 --$ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 -￿￿￿￿￿-￿’1 $ & ￿-￿,1 1 , -￿&0 -, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿,,’,-(￿￿￿-￿-1 -$ $ (￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿-(￿￿￿￿￿-￿--&) -￿,,’, -￿-1 -0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿-￿&0 ,’(’￿￿￿-￿’) (’) ’￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿,’￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(&& -￿&0 ,’ -￿’) ()
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>CC￿/￿F ￿9￿ ) &(1 &((&& () ($ ￿’ &-() ￿( &’$ ￿$ $ ,,) ￿- () ) ,￿&
/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< 3 &5 ,￿&,) 1 &￿(-& ,￿,(1 & ,￿(&1 ) -￿,’0 $ ,￿,’(& ,￿&0 0 ’
) --CK￿￿￿￿￿K￿,. ,.K￿￿￿￿￿K,-. ￿￿￿￿￿B,-. ￿￿￿￿,% % 1 ￿￿￿￿￿,% % 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿&) -C &) -CK￿￿￿￿￿K￿) --C
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ " <￿ ￿ % ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  
8::￿ 2￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ (￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿* ￿ 1￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿￿-￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿￿￿ ￿

















￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿2￿/￿￿￿:=* 5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# .￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿￿
# 2￿=:￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 0 ￿0 % $ ( -￿&,-& LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿1 $ 1 1 $ &￿￿￿￿-￿&,&,&,￿￿￿￿￿￿(0 ￿,-￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, 0 ￿1 $ 1 % -￿&,&, LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿,,￿&($ % $ ￿￿￿￿-￿,,,1 ) ) ￿￿￿￿￿,--￿’$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, # 2￿=:￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ,,￿&(0 - -￿,,,%LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿,,￿&&1 0 1 ￿￿￿￿-￿,,’,$ -￿￿￿￿￿￿% 1 ￿($ ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ,,￿&&1 1 -￿,,’& LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-,-& -￿-,1 ( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) 1 1 ’￿￿￿￿-￿-’’0 ) $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿(,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,1 1 0 ￿-￿-) 1 1 -￿-’’1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--1 0 ) ￿￿￿￿-￿-,&($ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’0 % , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿--1 1 -￿-,&’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,,,’,￿￿￿￿-￿-’) ) $ ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿1 -$ % -￿-,,, -￿-’) $
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-0 ,% -￿-&&1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 $ $ -￿￿￿￿-￿-(0 $ 0 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿(-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&,$ ￿-￿-1 $ $ -￿-(0 0LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,,’) ) ￿￿￿￿-￿-(--) % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 -(& ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-,,) -￿-(-, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,&) ) ) ￿￿￿￿-￿-0 0 ((0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿$ &￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-’0 ￿-￿,&) $ -￿-0 0 (
￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-,0 % -￿-&) % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&’-% ￿￿￿￿-￿-’’(0 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) ’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) 1 0 & ￿-￿-&’, -￿-’’’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’-% ’￿￿￿￿-￿-,0 % ,(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿&% ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&&’ ￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-’-% -￿-,0 %LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’0 ,) ￿￿￿￿-￿-’(&) ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿-% ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&0 ) % ￿-￿-’0 & -￿-’((
C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-0 (& -￿-&% 1LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,) (1 % 1 ￿￿￿￿-￿-’(% 1 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿) -￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---) -￿,) (% -￿-’’- LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,’&&,) ￿￿￿￿-￿-’% 1 1 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿1 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--’’ C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿,’&& -￿-’% %LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,1 ) ) &,￿￿￿￿-￿-1 &$ &-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿&) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&’% -￿,1 ) ) -￿-1 &$LL
C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-’$ ( -￿-(’, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’(,$ ￿￿￿￿-￿-’0 ,-1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿% &￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿() % 0 ￿-￿-’(& -￿-’0 , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,% % % ￿￿￿￿-￿-($ 1 &% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) ’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) 1 0 ( C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-&-- -￿-($ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-((&% ￿￿￿￿-￿,(’$ 0 &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’’(- -￿,-(( -￿,(’0
C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿--1 ’ -￿-(0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,,(’) -￿￿￿￿-￿-% ,$ ,(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&,) 0 -￿,,() -￿-% ,$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,% &) % ￿￿￿￿-￿-&--% ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿% $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿((1 - C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-,% ( -￿-&-, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ &,) 1 ￿￿￿￿-￿-$ &((% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿--￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(,1 % -￿-$ && -￿-$ &(
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* 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿&&0 $ -￿-) ’’ LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿&&0 -) (￿￿￿￿-￿-) ’’$ &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿,0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, -￿&&0 , -￿-) ’)LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’-% ’￿￿￿￿-￿--1 $ ) &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿0 (￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿2C6=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-’-% -￿--1 0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’-$ 1 ￿￿￿￿-￿--1 $ 0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿$ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿-￿-’-0 -￿--1 0LLL
# 26>:* =￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿$ $ $ $ -￿-&1 , LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ $ (,0 ￿￿￿￿-￿-&1 &-$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿&(￿) ,￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿-￿$ $ (& -￿-&1 & LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,% -(,$ ￿￿￿￿-￿-&’$ ) ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿0 &￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, 6/￿*￿# ￿# ￿@￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿,% -( -￿-&’0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,% ’(&) ￿￿￿￿-￿-&’0 (-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿1 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, -￿,% ’( -￿-&’0LLL
￿2C*￿￿:=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-0 ,& -￿--1 1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 ,$ 0 % ￿￿￿￿-￿--1 0 1 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿,$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, -￿-0 ,0 -￿--1 1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,$ 0 $ $ &￿￿￿￿-￿-’0 ’,,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿) ’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---’ * 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿,$ 0 0 -￿-’0 ’ LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,$ $ % 0 $ ￿￿￿￿-￿-’0 ’% ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿) &￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---’ -￿,$ 0 - -￿-’0 )LLL
￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-&($ -￿-,,)LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&&% 1 ￿￿￿￿-￿-,,) ’-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿% % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’$ ) ￿-￿-&(- -￿-,,)LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,0 % % 1 ￿￿￿￿-￿--1 $ &’￿￿￿￿￿￿&-￿1 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿2*C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿,1 -- -￿--1 $LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,1 ,% % ￿￿￿￿-￿--1 $ $ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿&-￿% % ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿-￿,1 &- -￿--1 0LLL
:=￿*@.*2?￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-$ ,% -￿-,1 ( LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ ,% 0 ￿￿￿￿-￿-,1 (&&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿(1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---0 ￿-￿-$ &- -￿-,1 ( LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,,$ % ￿￿￿￿-￿-,,) (’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿-,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(,,- :*￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-,,0 -￿-,,) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,,0 ,￿￿￿￿-￿-,,) 1 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿-,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(,&, ￿-￿-,,0 -￿-,,$
:=9 # 2 =.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-) ’& -￿-&-& LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) &$ 1 ￿￿￿￿-￿-&-() 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿) % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--% 0 ￿-￿-) &0 -￿-&-’ LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿--0 &% &￿￿￿￿-￿-&-% $ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿() ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 &1 , # 26>:* =￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿--0 ( -￿-&,- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿--1 (0 -￿￿￿￿-￿-&,-1 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ % ,) -￿--1 ’ -￿-&,,
*￿E￿/.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-0 1 ( -￿-’&( L ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿< ￿/.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 % ’% 1 ￿￿￿￿-￿-’&() &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿1 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ -$ -￿-0 % ) -￿-’&’ L ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿--) 1 () ￿￿￿￿-￿-,&1 ’,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ ’% $ :=￿*@.*2?￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿--) 1 -￿-,&1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿--$ 1 ’,￿￿￿￿-￿-,&1 0 (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) (￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) % ) & -￿--$ 1 -￿-,&%
C￿2￿:/>￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-% 0 1 -￿,&-( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 0 % &￿￿￿￿-￿,&-) $ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) ,1 & ￿-￿-0 0 % -￿,&-$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(,’) -￿￿￿￿-￿-,% ) $ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿$ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-1 & :=9# 2 =.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-(,) -￿-,% $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-((,(-￿￿￿￿-￿-,% $ (% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿$ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-% ,1 -￿-((, -￿-,% $L
9 ￿/*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿((,% -￿-’% & LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(&’-% ￿￿￿￿-￿-’% &$ $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿) 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿-￿(&’, -￿-’% ( LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿< ￿/.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’’0 % % ￿￿￿￿-￿-&-% -1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿,’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(&( *￿E￿/.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-’’1 -￿-&-%LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿< ￿/.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’(&1 ’￿￿￿￿-￿-&,-’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿-$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(% % -￿-’(( -￿-&,- LL
￿G=￿9:=>￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿&-,% -￿-&’$LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&-) () ￿￿￿￿-￿-&’0 ,) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿(,￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿-￿&-) ’ -￿-&’0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 1 ’&￿￿￿￿-￿-&’) 1 &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿$ -￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---( ￿G=￿9 :=>￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿-1 1 ’ -￿-&’$LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 $ 0 ,￿￿￿￿-￿-&) ’,$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿’,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---0 ￿-￿-1 $ 0 -￿-&) ’ LLL
￿*￿￿*.￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿,,1 ’ -￿-&-$LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿,,% ’’$ ￿￿￿￿-￿-&-$ ) % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, -￿,,% ’ -￿-&-0LLL
￿￿￿￿*.￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-% -, -￿-&’’ LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 % ’&) ￿￿￿￿-￿-&’’,&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿$ $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---( -￿-1 % ’ -￿-&’’ LLL
￿# ￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿-1 -1 -￿-&&1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 $ % -(￿￿￿￿-￿-&&% ,0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿0 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---& -￿-1 $ % -￿-&&%LLL
￿/C￿.#  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿) 1 ) $ -￿-$ $ %LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) 1 (&$ ￿￿￿￿-￿-$ $ 1 ’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿0 (￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---, ￿-￿) 1 (( -￿-$ $ 1LLL
*￿F ￿:￿￿< -￿0 0 $ ) -￿0 0 0 $ *￿F ￿:￿￿< -￿0 (’1 -￿0 (’1
2 &,(& &,(& 2 ,1 ’’ ,1 ’’
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ <
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ - ￿ 26 ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ 4￿ - ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ * ￿ # & ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ 1￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
*; ￿2￿￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ .; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
=< ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿


















banker to the 
event
Unmatched 
Events: do not 









Part of the 
“strongest”
relationship*: the 
event is assigned 









* The strength of relationship is measured by the number of 















banker to the 
event
Unmatched 
Events: do not 









Part of the 
“strongest”
relationship*: the 
event is assigned 









* The strength of relationship is measured by the number of 
repeated transactions by a given financial institution in the 
window. 
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿--￿-0 1 ) 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’0 ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿$ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-,1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿:=￿￿:￿￿ -￿-0 1 $ -￿-’0 )L -￿-0 $ ’ -￿-’0 - ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) ,$ --$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-% &) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿(,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿:=￿￿:￿￿ -￿) ,$ - -￿-% &)LLL -￿) ,-$ -￿-% 0 ’ LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&(’,&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&) ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿1 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿.*￿?￿￿ ￿-￿&(’, -￿-&) )LLL ￿-￿&(’$ -￿-&$ , LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&% ) ,￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-0 -&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ ) ,,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿.*￿?￿￿ ￿-￿-&% ) -￿-0 -& ￿-￿-&% % -￿-$ 1 -
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ () % ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿0 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--) 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!  =.￿:=￿*@ ￿-￿-$ ($ -￿-&’0LL ￿-￿-$ 1 $ -￿-&’%LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&’1 % % 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’$ &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿’1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!  =.￿:=￿*@ -￿&’% - -￿-’$ & LLL -￿&) ’, -￿-’’)LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,’% ) $ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) ’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿$ &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--1 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿ .￿@/￿￿ -￿,’% $ -￿-) ’0LLL -￿,’$ & -￿-) ) , LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(% (-1 ’￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,&) 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿,’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿ .￿@/￿￿ -￿(% (, -￿,&) 0LLL -￿(1 () -￿,(,& LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,0 ,0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&$ (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿$ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’% &1 ￿￿￿￿A￿￿+ ￿￿￿ A/:?￿*￿ ￿-￿-,0 & -￿-&$ ( ￿-￿-,1 - -￿-&) - ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’&1 (&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) $ &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿) 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,-,￿￿￿￿A￿￿+ ￿￿￿ A/:?￿*￿ -￿-’&1 -￿-) $ & -￿-’0 ’ -￿-) 1 ’
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 $ ) $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&) ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿((￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2*￿￿=￿ ￿-￿-1 $ $ -￿-&) )LLL ￿-￿-1 1 0 -￿-&’$LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’% 0 ) $ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&,&￿￿￿￿￿￿&’￿’&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2*￿￿=￿ -￿’% 0 $ -￿-&,& LLL -￿’% ,$ -￿-&,’ LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’1 1 0 ’&￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) 1 $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿-1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ * 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>= -￿’1 1 0 -￿-) 1 $LLL -￿’$ $ $ -￿-) 1 $LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿1 -(-% $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,$ 1 &￿￿￿￿￿￿,-￿1 % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ * 7 C?￿￿=6=:*>= ,￿1 -(, -￿,$ 1 & LLL ,￿1 $ ) ) -￿,0 ,’ LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿% ’1 (% ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ 0 ,￿￿￿￿￿￿&% ￿$ -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ *** ￿,￿% ’1 ’ -￿-$ 0 , LLL ￿,￿% -(0 -￿-$ ’%LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿,&$ ,0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) -&% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿&’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ *** ￿&￿,&$ & -￿) -&%LLL ￿&￿--(’ -￿’% ’)LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿0 ’% ) &￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ $ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿&0 ￿,&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿ ** ￿,￿0 ’% ) -￿-$ $ , LLL ￿,￿1 ,% 1 -￿-$ ’1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿’1 -) 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿’&$ &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿&$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--,,￿￿￿￿￿￿ ** ￿,￿’1 -$ -￿’&$ & LLL ￿,￿’’&) -￿’(% ’ LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿(1 1 % 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-$ &&￿￿￿￿￿￿&&￿% (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿ * ￿,￿(1 % - -￿-$ && LLL ￿,￿’&-% -￿-) 1 1LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&-% ’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿(’$ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿) (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿---’￿￿￿￿￿ * ￿,￿&-% ) -￿(’$ ’ LLL ￿,￿,$ && -￿() 0 1LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿0 ) ((% ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-) &&￿￿￿￿￿￿,) ￿-1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ... ￿-￿0 ) (’ -￿-) && LLL ￿-￿0 ’0 ( -￿-) &( LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿) 1 -(-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&-1 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿1 (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿--’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ... ￿-￿) 1 -( -￿&-1 0LLL ￿-￿) 0 % ) -￿,% % 0LLL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&0 $ $ -￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’’$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿($ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿ .. ￿-￿&0 $ $ -￿-’’$LLL ￿-￿&$ 0 ’ -￿-’&0LLL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,($ ’0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,-0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿&0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&-) 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ .. ￿-￿,($ ) -￿,-0 1 ￿-￿,’0 , -￿,,-(
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-1 0 0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’(% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿% % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-’$ $ ￿￿￿￿￿ . ￿-￿-1 0 1 -￿-’(%LL ￿-￿-1 ’% -￿-’&( LL ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿&,’$ &￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-% -$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿((￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-&--￿￿￿￿￿ . ￿-￿&,’$ -￿-% -$LL ￿-￿&,% & -￿-1 % %LL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) (￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-((0 () ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-,0 (￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿) ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,(,1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ :*￿=9/:= -￿-((0 -￿-,0 - LL -￿-(,1 -￿-,$ 0L ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) (￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿,’(1 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿-(,(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿(% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿K￿---,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ :*￿=9 /:= ￿-￿,’(% -￿-(,( LLL ￿-￿,) $ ( -￿-&% 1LLL
2 ,&’-) ,&’-) 2 ,&’-) ,&’-)
>CC￿/￿F ￿9￿ ,) 1 ) &￿( ,$ ’--￿0 >CC￿/￿F ￿9￿ ,) 1 ) &￿( ,$ ’--￿0
# & ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
,￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 G-; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿>CC￿/￿F ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9￿￿￿￿￿￿￿D 2
F ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 &5 ,￿&0 0 % ,￿(&&, ￿￿￿￿￿< 3 &5 ,￿&0 0 % ,￿(&&,
￿2*C￿￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
*; ￿2￿￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ .; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿; ￿2￿￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ; ￿# .￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ =&&￿ ￿-￿ 3 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ " " " ￿ ￿ % ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  
8::￿ 2￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ (￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿￿-￿ 7￿￿￿￿￿ ￿$ ￿ 1￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿ )￿￿$ ￿ )￿￿ ￿ ￿ ; ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’￿￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿￿￿ ￿￿&￿￿
￿2￿￿:=* ￿:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿